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**Capitalist energy production reduces dynamic environments to pure exchange value to increase exploitation and accumulation**

**Clark and York ‘8** Brett Clark, assistant professor of sociology at North Carolina State University, and Richard York, coeditor of Organization & Environment and associate professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, “Rifts and Shifts: Getting to the Root of Environmental Crises,” Monthly Review, Vol. 60, Issue 06, November 2008

The development of energy production technologies provides one of the best examples of rifts and shifts, as technological fixes to energy problems create new ecological crises in the attempt to alleviate old ones. Biomass, particularly wood, has, of course, been one of the primary energy sources humans have depended on throughout their history. The development of more energy intensive processes, such as the smelting of metals, was, therefore, connected with greater pressure on forests, as trees were fed to the fires. By the time the Industrial Revolution began to emerge in Europe, vast regions of the continent had already been deforested, particularly in areas close to major sites of production, and much of this deforestation was driven by the demand for fuel. As industrialization advanced, new sources of power were desired to fuel the machines that allowed for production to take place on a growing scale. Whole forests could be devoured at an unprecedented rate, making wood ever more scarce. The tension between the desire of the capitalist owners of the new industrial technologies for expanding the accumulation of capital and the biophysical limits of Earth were apparent from the start of the Industrial Revolution. However, capitalists did not concern themselves with the internal contradictions of capitalism, except insofar as they were barriers to be transcended. Thus, efforts to achieve what we would today call sustainability were not even considered by the elite. Rather, coal (and subsequently other fossil fuels) quickly became the standard fuel of industry, temporarily sidestepping the fuelwood crisis (although forests continued to fall due to the many demands placed on them) but laying the foundations for our current global climate change crisis by dramatically increasing the emission of carbon dioxide.16 The pattern has remained similar to how it was in the early years of the Industrial Revolution. Oil was quickly added to coal as a fuel source and a variety of other energy sources were increasingly exploited. Among these was hydropower, the generation of which requires damming rivers, and thus destroying aquatic ecosystems. For example, the expansion of hydropower over the twentieth century in the U.S. Pacific Northwest was the primary force leading to the widespread depletion and extinction of salmon runs. Nuclear power was, of course, the most controversial addition to the power mix. Despite initial claims that it would provide clean, unlimited power that would be too cheap to meter, it proved to be an expensive, risky power source that produced long-lived highly radioactive waste for which safe long-term storage sites have been nearly impossible to develop. Now, in the twenty-first century, with global climate change finally being recognized by the elite as a serious problem, the proposed solutions are, as we would expect, to shift the problem from one form of energy to a new form of energy. Nuclear power, despite its drop in popularity toward the end of the last century, due to high costs and widespread public opposition, is now very much back on the agenda, with new promises of how the new nuclear plants are safer—never mind the issue of radioactive waste. We are also regaled with promises of agrofuels, ironically bringing us back to the pre-coal energy crisis. Recent scientific reports note that growing crops for agrofuel to feed cars may actually increase the carbon emitted into the atmosphere.17 But even this ignores the fact that the production of agrofuel would be based on unsustainable agricultural practices that demand massive inputs of fertilizers and would only further the depletion of soil nutrients, bringing us back to the metabolic rift that Marx originally addressed. Two recent examples of technical approaches to mitigating climate change are particularly illustrative of how technological optimism distracts us from the political-economic sources of our environmental problems. Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen, who admirably played a central role in identifying and analyzing human-generated ozone depletion in the stratosphere, recently argued that climate change can be avoided by injecting sulfur particles into the stratosphere to increase the albedo of the Earth, and thus reflect more of the sun’s energy back into space, which would counter the warming stemming from rising concentrations of greenhouse gases. Although no doubt offered sincerely and out of desperation stemming from the failure of those in power adequately to address the mounting climate crisis, the technical framing of the climate change issue makes it easy for political and business leaders to avoid addressing greenhouse gas emissions, since they can claim that technical fixes make it unnecessary to take action to preserve forests and curtail the burning of fossil fuels. Engineering the atmosphere on this scale is likely to have many far-reaching consequences (acid rain being only the most obvious), many of which have not been anticipated. In a similar vein, well-known physicist Freeman Dyson recently suggested that we can avoid global climate change by replacing one-quarter of the world’s forests with genetically engineered carbon-eating trees. The ecological consequences of such an action would likely be extraordinary. Both of these so-called solutions avoid addressing the dynamics of an economic system that is largely structured around burning fossil fuels, that must constantly renew itself on a larger scale, and that runs roughshod over nature. Often techno-solutions are proposed in a manner that suggests they are completely removed from the world as it operates. The irony is that such narrowly conceived “solutions” would only serve as a means to prop up the very forces driving ecological degradation, allowing those forces to continue to operate, as they create additional ecological rifts.18

**Economics eradicates socio-historical analysis by reducing complex productive relations to rational-choice theory and mathematical models—causes constant crisis—the entire system is unredeemable**

**Fine and Milonakis ’11** Ben Fine, SOAS, University of London, Dimitris Milonakis, University of Crete, “‘Useless but True’: Economic Crisis and the Peculiarities of Economic Science,” Historical Materialism 19.2 (2011) pp. 3-31

Generally, **in science, when some rare event occurs which has a major impact,** a ‘black swan’, in Taleb’s terminology,7 which was not predicted by the current state-of-the-art scientific tools, **or some new evidence is discovered which cannot be explained by these tools, representing an ‘anomaly’**, in Kuhnian terminology, **then the scientific field may be shaken and new proposals, tools, theories, etc. are put forward to explain the hitherto inexplicable event or new evidence.** One could name countless examples from the history of science. Just a couple will suffice. Take the example of oceanography. On New Year’s Day in 1995, the Draupner oil-rig radar-sensor in the North Sea recorded, for the first time in history, a giant wave 26 metres in height which, until then, according to all scientific knowledge based on the linear models in use, was thought practically impossible. According to the bell-shaped curves derived from this model, an unusual event, a so-to-speak freak-wave of, say, 30 metres in height, could only occur once every 10,000 years. This new discovery caused an upheaval in oceanography with some scientists turning to the strange world of quantum-mechanics to find part of the explanation to the riddle of the existence of monster waves.8 Similarly, when, back in the 1960s, neuroscientists discovered that if some parts of the brain failed, then sometimes other parts can take over their functions, the scientific community was shaken and a new theory, neuroplasticity, was developed to cope with these new findings.9 Now, the recent economic crisis does represent a huge anomaly with respect to all existing mainstream-theories. **A huge wave has hit the world-economy, a crisis that was thought impossible by** (and still denied by some) **mainstream-economic theorising based mostly on mathematical modelling and the twin assumptions of representative rational agents and the efficient-market hypothesis**.10 **The Gaussian bell-shaped curves used by economists and based on these assumptions preclude the possibility of such an event taking place. Not only was the crisis not predicted** (nor could it have been by these models), **but, after the event, no explanation remains possible within mainstream-neoclassical economics other than as what might be termed the inefficient-market hypothesis. So, will there be a similar freak-wave effect in economic science? On top of the (epistemological) differences involved between these (natural) sciences and economics, there is another big difference**. All the **events** mentioned above, **which caused the upheaval in the respective sciences, refer to newly-available evidence.** What is remarkable, **in the case of our scientific field**, is that **the occurrence of big crises and deep recessions** (unlike the freak-waves of the deep ocean) **are not a newly-observed phenomenon**. As is well-known, **similar crises have hit the world-economy in the 1870s, the 1930s and the 1970s. As for more-restricted financial crises, recent economic history is full of such cases**.11 Indeed, **unlike the physical sciences, economics is dominated by such rare and extreme events**.12 What is astonishing is that **the sector most prone to such phenomena**, viz. **the financial sector, has** until recently, and to some extent even now, **been considered by mainstream-financial economists as the Mecca of rationality and market-efficiency.** In the past similar, significant events have proved to be the midwives of important developments in economic science, like the birth of Keynes’s General Theory following the Great Depression of the 1930s. Will something similar happen this time around? Richard Posner of the University of Chicago and, until recently, a staunch supporter of the neoliberal Chicago school, but now turned Keynesian, thinks so. According to him, what is happening in economics following the crisis is reminiscent of ‘what happened to cosmology after Edwin Hubble discovered that the universe was expanding, and was much larger than scientists believed. The profession fell into turmoil, with some physicists sticking to existing theories, while others came up with the big bang theory’.13 As Krugman has said, **just before the crisis erupted economists ‘were congratulating themselves over the success of their field’**.14 After all, this was the era of ‘great moderation’ – ‘the substantial decline in economic volatility’ – that the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Ben Bernanke, has partly attributed to ‘improved performance of macroeconomic policies’.15 **This was** also **the era of the emerging consensus in macroeconomics**. A consensus **based on the most-horrendously unrealistic assumptions of the representative agent holding rational expectations and the market-efficiency hypothesis**. As Greenspan himself has admitted, all of this collapsed in September 2008. Before coming to current theoretical developments, let us first take a look at what happened back in the thirties. Although the interwar-period was an era of pluralism in economics, with different schools of thought using vastly different types of organon and with different conceptual frameworks flourishing, for the whole period until the 1929 Wall Street crash, the view that was dominant within ‘neoclassical’ economics was that markets are efficient, and, if left alone, they would tend to get back to full-employment equilibrium. The result of these beliefs was that, after the 1929 crash, the market was left on its own to cope with the consequences of the crisis. The ensuing deepest crisis and depression of the twentieth century shook the credibility of neoclassical theory and the belief in the self-regulating abilities of the market almost beyond repair. This whole intellectual edifice collapsed after the 1929 crash. Or so it seemed at the time. The theoretical gap was filled by John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory. This is one instance for which it can safely be said that the dramatic changes in the economic sphere brought about significant changes in economic thought. Keynes’s aim was to save capitalism from its own excesses, putting as his central goal the achievement of full employment. Another reason why Keynes’s work had the potential for a revolutionary-scientific paradigm-shift à la Kuhn was that, despite its weaknesses, the changes it could potentially bring about were changes from without, in the sense that it broke with neoclassical economics in important and radical ways. Firstly, he got rid of the individualistic, utilitarian overtones of neoclassical economics as well as the representative individual. Secondly, he denounced the self-equilibrating tendency of the economy through the concepts of ‘deficient demand’ and ‘unemployment equilibrium’. Third, he placed emphasis on the role of systemic uncertainty. These are certainly radical innovations. But did they revolutionise economics? Although Keynes’s work did have a significant effect policy-wise, at least for the period 1945–70, its revolutionary effects on economic science in the longer run are more questionable, and certainly limited. As far as economic policy is concerned, Keynes’s new ideas did gain considerable currency after World-War Two. ‘The Beveridge Report of 1942 in Great Britain and the Employment Act of 1946 in the United States provided blueprints for government involvement in the macroeconomy along Keynesian lines’.16 For a couple of decades after the publication of the General Theory, Keynesian economics was considered work at the edge.17 Even then, however, Keynesian economics was already something different from Keynes’s own economics. In the longer term, however, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the impact of Keynes’s economics on economic theory has been even more limited, especially in relation to Keynes’s own methodology and theoretical frame. For, **just after Keynes’s book appeared, another process was set in motion**. It was **associated with the increasing mathematisation, axiomatisation and formalisation of economics which was boosted by the Great Depression and also,** as Mirowski has shown, **by the War through the militarisation of scientific research it brought about, leading to the development of advanced mathematical tools, what later became known as operations-research, but also artificial intelligence and information-theory. These were then applied to economics, leading to a new economic methodology**.18 **Deduction and mathematical modelling gradually gained the upper hand at the expense of other modes of analysis and reasoning. This process of formalisation and mathematisation has as a prerequisite the, at least implicit, if putative, excision of the social and the historical element from economic theorising, as manifested in the transition from political economy to economics, leading to an almost brand-new scientific body totally detached from its historical and social setting**. In other words, the aim was the construction of a universally-valid theoretical corpus irrespective of the social and the historical. Nowhere is this detachment more apparent than in the tendency of the financial sector nowadays to hire physics- and mathematics-graduates, totally innocent of the actual workings of the economy, what the Wall Street Journal reporter Scott Patterson has called in his recent book ‘the quants’, where he describes ‘how the new breed of math whizzes conquered Wall Street and nearly destroyed it’.19 As Greenspan himself has said in his testimony in front of the US-Congress a month after the financial crash of September 2008, it was the failure to properly price such risky assets that precipitated the crisis. In recent decades, a vast risk management and pricing system has evolved, combining the best insights of mathematicians and finance experts supported by major advances in computer and communications technology. . . . This modern risk management paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice collapsed in the summer of last year.20 This process of formalisation has created a whole generation of so-called idiot savants, scientists with excellent technical skills but without true knowledge of the functioning of the economy. As Taleb puts it, these scholars ‘resemble Locke’s definition of a madman: someone “reasoning correctly from erroneous Premises” ‘.21 This problem was raised dramatically in a study by Klamer and Colander of the five most-distinguished doctoral programmes in economics in American universities, based upon questionnaires given to Ph.D.-candidates to answer, and interviews with them. One of the conclusions of the research is stunning. Of those questioned, only 3.4 per cent thought that knowledge about the real economy was very important for success in the doctorate-programme, while 57 per cent thought that excellence in mathematics to be very important. In other words, the students thought that knowledge of techniques and not of the real economy was the basic prerequisite for success in their doctorate-programme.22 The sickness of modern economics has been the subject of increasing attack by a series of leading mainstream-economists from before the crisis. Even Milton Friedman deplored the way in which, ‘economics has become increasingly an arcane branch of mathematics rather than dealing with economic problems’.23 Similarly Buiter, writing after the crisis, talks about ‘the unfortunate uselessness of most “state of the art” academic monetary economics’,24 and, for Paul Krugman, ‘the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive looking mathematics, for truth. . . . The central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess’.25 What is amazing is that these last words come from one of the main practitioners of the economics he is criticising and after he had himself been amply rewarded with a Nobel Prize for this. What is even more amazing is that Krugman had already tried to make a mockery of this fatal tendency in economics early on in 1978 when he wrote a sarcastic article entitled ‘The Theory of Interstellar Trade’. In his abstract we read: This paper extends interplanetary trade theory to an interstellar setting. It is chiefly concerned with the following question: how should interest charges on goods in transit be computed when the goods travel at close to the speed of light? This is a problem because the time taken in transit will appear less to an observer travelling with the goods than to a stationary observer. A solution is derived from economic theory, and two useless but true theorems are proved.26 ‘Useless but true’: in these three words of Krugman can be found what is essentially wrong with modern economics: it is all about theoretical exercises, mostly taking a mathematical form, which may be valid mathematically, although the analytical robustness of some of these models is also questionable, but useless in any other sense and empty of any practical relevance. This is the problem of formalism in economics, the triumph of form over substance. 27 The seeds of the appearance and further development of this tendency within economic science go back to the marginalist revolution. **The explicit attempt** since then **has been to transform economics into a ‘rigorous’ science on a par with positive sciences and devoid of any normative statements or value-judgments. This was done partly by borrowing tools and concepts such as equilibrium and optimisation from the physical sciences, particularly, to begin with, from static mechanics, and then subsequently from thermodynamics**. ‘The pure science of economics’, says Walras, one of the protagonists of the marginalist revolution, ‘is a science that resembles the physico-mathematical sciences in every respect’.28 And, what is more, ‘the scholar has the right to pursue science for its own sake’, equating geometry with economics in this respect.29 Such formalism did not become dominant within the profession until after the Second World-War. It was given a new impetus by the works of Hicks’s Value and Capital, and Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis, culminating in the mathematical proof for the existence of equilibrium by Arrow and Debreu in 1954.30 Since then, the Samuelsonian tool of constrained optimisation borrowed from thermodynamics became the symbol of the new formalist era, accompanied by Americanisation and standardisation of the discipline, a truly Fordist intellectualism in which you can have any economics as long as it is neoclassical. **Concomitant with this formalisation-process is a newly-acquired self-confidence of the practitioners of this method which was translated into a superiority-syndrome vis-a-vis the other social sciences,** as exemplified by the process of Gary-Becker-style Chicago economics-imperialism, or, in other words, the process of colonisation of other social sciences using the so-called ‘economic method’ to analyse all social phenomena.31 This process of formalisation and homogenisation of economics reached a climax approaching near-total dominance in the 1970s. This was also the time that heterodox approaches in economics made a more dynamic appearance and heterodox institutions proliferated following the radicalisation brought about by the Vietnam War, and the developments inside the profession.32 Following the formalist revolution of the 1950s, only those aspects of Keynes’s thought which could be modelled were incorporated into what came to be known as the ‘neoclassical synthesis’. The subsumption of Keynes’s thought to the formalist revolution, starting with Hicks’s IS/LM-formulation33 just one year after the publication of Keynes’s General Theory, meant that all novel and radical aspects of his thought were either left out altogether or else reformulated in mathematical or diagrammatical form, beyond recognition. This gave rise to what has variously been called ‘bastard Keynesianism’ by Joan Robinson, or ‘hydraulic Keynesianism’.34 As Skidelsky puts it, ‘Keynes imposed himself on the profession by a series of profound insights into human behaviour which fitted the turbulence of his times. But these were never – could never be – properly integrated into the core of the discipline, which expelled them as soon as it conveniently could’.35 Substantively, then, Keynes could be thought of as the first major victim of the formalist revolution. So much so, that the one Keynesian school which adhered most closely to Keynes’s own core-principles and concepts is nowadays classified as heterodox and suffers the same fate from mainstream-economists as any other heterodox school. **This process of subsumption, which culminated in the ‘microfoundations of macroeconomics’ project, coupled with the monetarist and, later on, new classical counter-revolution in macroeconomics, propelled by the stagflation-crisis of the 1970s, led within macroeconomics to the elimination of Keynes’s economics and its transformation into the new Keynesianism of microeconomic market-imperfections, and eventually to the almost-total eclipse of macroeconomics as a distinct field vis-a-vis microeconomics**.36 The fate of Keynesianism was described vividly and ironically by Nobel laureate Robert Lucas in 1980, when he remarked that ‘One cannot find good, over-forty economists who identify themselves or their work as “Keynesian”. . . . At research seminars, people don’t take Keynesian theorising seriously any more; the audience starts to whisper and giggle to one another’.37 This is the economics of the neoliberal era of Reagan and Thatcher, based on the twin assumptions of rational expectations and the efficient-market hypothesis. **It signifies a return to the pre-Keynes era, the virtual world of the economist’s imagination, inhabited by perfectly rational and egotistic human beings, forming rational expectations about the future and exchanging their products in perfectly competitive markets, a virtual world marred only by random shocks and, of course, far-from-random government. The same fate as Keynesianism faced any other attempt at providing a different mode of analysis, so much so that, in our own day, anything that cannot be modelled is not considered as economics and left out of consideration altogether. This total lack of tolerance is another basic attribute of present-day economics, alongside a frighteningly intellectually-barbaric treatment of the history of economic thought and of methodology within the discipline. Not only is mainstream-neoclassical economics intolerant of alternatives. It exhibits the same indifference towards any criticism, even internal criticisms that derive from within its own ranks. Some** devastating **such criticisms have been,** for example, **the** so-called **Cambridge Capital-Controversy of the 1960s, which brought into question the validity of the concept of aggregate capital; and the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu** (SMD for short) **impossibility-theorem developed in the 1970s, which showed that aggregate excess-demands were arbitrary and that there can be no determinateness of general equilibrium**. All this led Christopher Bliss to declare that ‘the near emptiness of general equilibrium theory is a theorem of the theory’.38 What was the result? **Mainstream-economics simply carried on regardless, as if these critiques had never taken place.** As Rizvi puts it, ‘very few troublesome parts of the theory have been thoroughly eliminated: social welfare functions, well-behaved aggregate demands, and Nash equilibria remain prominent in the textbooks’.39 Thus, **whilst orthodoxy prides itself on its rigour and as a science, in part in light of its commitment to mathematical reasoning, that reasoning always takes second place if its results are unpalatable. Other causes of mainstream-arrogance and intransigence are the institutional monopoly enjoyed by the elite of the profession over the positions in top universities and academic journals, attracting the lion’s share of funding, occupying central public positions and being awarded 90 per cent of Nobel prizes in economics**. In this respect, this year’s award of the Nobel prize is a scandal. As Varoufakis puts it, **Imagine a world ravaged by a plague, and suppose that the year’s Nobel Prize for Medicine is awarded to researchers whose whole career is based on the assumption that plagues are impossible**. The world would have been outraged. That is precisely how we should feel about yesterday’s announcement of the recipients of the 2010 Nobel Prize. . . . Interestingly, these three fine mathematical economists have one thing in common, other than their work on labor markets: in their voluminous theoretical output on unemployment and the like, there is not a smidgeon of a hint, of a mention, of an economic crisis which may boost unemployment in every sector and for all types of workers. Not one!40 **To this should be added the direct vested interests of many academics, especially in the financial sector**, a feature that was exacerbated during the financialisation-era. Philip Mirowski asks:41 Does anyone care that Martin **Feldstein was on the board of AIG in the run up to its disastrous failure**? Or that Paul **Krugman once consulted for Enron** (and got radicalised after the New York Times made him foreswear such perks)? Is anyone curious about the tangled history of funding and organisation of the Chicago School of Economics? Does anyone care that Larry **Summers worked for numerous hedge funds and investment firms before they had to be rescued by an administration that included . . . Larry Summers?** All of this Charles Ferguson highlights as ‘the convergence of academic economics, Wall Street and political power’, not least through his stunning film on the financial crisis and economists.42 Neoliberalism, financialisation and the growing power and influence of the financial sector that these have brought about all played an important role in the latest developments in economic science. Deep down, however, **it is the very nature of the system and the ideological need for its justification that lies behind this type of theory**. As Georg Lukacs has said, **‘[t]he capitalist process of rationalisation based on private economic calculation requires that every manifestation of life shall exhibit [an] interaction between details which are subject to laws and a totality ruled by chance. It presupposes a society so structured’**.43 **Hence the conceptualisation of the current crisis as a chance-occurrence, a black swan, that could not be predicted** and, once there, cannot be explained other than as a chance-occurrence intractable by scientific knowledge. In short, **the interests of the capitalist system, and of finance in particular, not only dominate economic discourse, but the latter also dysfunctionally suffers the orthodoxy that it deserves, the mindless pursuit of financial stability on the basis of models of both the more-or-less-perfect-market hypothesis and of the moreor- less perfectly-rational individual.** So what are the chances that this time it will be different as far as the impact of the global crisis on economic science is concerned? The picture we have drawn so far of the state of our science does not leave much room for optimism. Despite some heavy criticism coming mostly, but not exclusively, from the Keynesian and neo-Keynesian camps (including Krugman, Stiglitz, and Skidelsky, but also the Chicago economist Richard Posner), the reactions so far do not lend themselves to much optimism. For Chicago economists like Eugene Fama (the main modern exponent of efficient-market theory) and John Cochrane, it is business as usual. As Fama puts it, We don’t know what causes recessions. Now I’m not a macroeconomist so I don’t feel bad about that. (Laughs) We’ve never known. . . . Economics is not very good at explaining swings in economic activity.44 Fama and mainstream-economics, then, cannot explain crises, so we might just as well pretend that they do not exist. If this is not a direct confession of the total intellectual bankruptcy of Chicago-style mainstream-economics, then what is? And for Cochrane, talking after the crisis, ‘rational expectations and efficient markets theories are both consistent with big price crashes. . . . What [the] efficient markets [hypothesis] says is that prices today contain the available information about the future’.45 So all the information about the future is available and yet crises are not just unpredictable from within this model, they simply cannot happen, just like giant waves within the linear models of wave-formation. For others, at least willing to recognise that something more by way of explanation is required, we need better models that would either take into account market-imperfections like the ‘New Keynesians’,46 or market-dynamics through the use of a ‘different type of mathematics’ or other sophisticated models coming from engineering, computing or physics,47 much like what happened in wave-theory and oceanography following the discovery of giant waves and the adoption of models from quantum-mechanics. Thus, for Solow, there are other traditions in economics which include ‘various market frictions and imperfections like rigid prices and wages, asymmetries of information, time lags, and so on’ which provide better ways of doing macroeconomics.48 A more genuine return to Keynes is the third escape-route. This is done mostly by emphasising some aspect of Keynes’s economics which has been totally forgotten by mainstream-economics. The aspect most commonly chosen is radical uncertainty and the animal-spirits of capitalism associated with it.49 This, especially in the case of Akerlof and Shiller, is associated with the behavioural school in economics, which seeks the explanation of economic phenomena by delving deeper into the psyche of individuals. The emphasis here is laid on the psychological and even ‘irrational’ factors influencing human behaviour, such as confidence, fairness, corruption, money-illusion, etc., which are seen as the ‘ultimate drivers of the economy’.50 Of these factors, only the role of confidence in the economy has anything to do with Keynes’s work. The usual story is that uncertainty causes sharp changes in expectations and confidence, which cause major changes in share-prices, bringing about sharp alterations in consumption, investment and employment. What is not explained, however, is the source of this uncertainty and the epistemological foundations of such ‘irrational’ behaviour, both of which must be sought in the structural characteristics of the capitalist system which, however, are systematically and suspiciously absent from all of these accounts. Behavioural economics has been one of the main new research-projects within mainstream-economics in recent years. Other new research-programmes include (classical, behavioural, evolutionary) game-theory, experimental economics, evolutionary economics, agent-based complexity-theory and neuroeconomics. The appearance of these new research-programmes has led commentators such as Colander and Davis to talk about the ‘death of neoclassical economics’ and the transition from the era of neoclassical dominance to mainstream pluralism.51 This transition was made possible, according to Colander, Holt and Rosser,52 by new technology and especially developments in computing which allowed for the use of more complex models. And, although it was brought about by cumulative-evolutionary changes rather than a sudden paradigm-shift, the end-result will be no less revolutionary in its effects. One common element in **these new research-programmes** is that they all **originate from fields outside of economics, such as mathematics** (gametheory), **psychology** (behavioural economics), **neo-Darwinian biology** (evolutionary economics), **neuroscience** (neuroeconomics), **while the experimental method has long been applied in the natural and physical sciences**. This process of importation of methods and concepts from other sciences has been called ‘inverse imperialism’, and has led Davis to the conclusion that they represent ‘genuinely different approaches’.53 **But does this amount to true scientific pluralism? The answer is no.** The reason is that, **despite their different outlooks, all of these approaches have two things in common: first, their adherence to axiomatic model-building as their preferred methodological approach and, second, their focus on the individual**.54 Indeed Colander, following Solow and Niehans, defines modern or, as he calls it, ‘New-Millennium Economics’, not in terms of its content but its method: ‘the modeling approach to problems’, he says, ‘is the central problem of modern economics’.55 **All of the new research-programmes mentioned above then share a common language**, so to speak, which is none other than that **of formalism. The formalist revolution,** then, **reigns supreme, even in this supposedly post-neoclassical, ‘mainstream-pluralist’ era**, and, other differences apart, keeps itself in line with it. Indicative of this is that, in their book, The Changing Face of Economics, Colander et al. have interviewed eleven ‘cutting-edge economists’, as they call them, coming mostly from the ranks of the ‘inside-the-mainstream’ heterodoxy-group.56 Nine of them do highly technical model-building work. Generally, this is true for both pure-theory models and applied-policy models. The old distinction between the science of economics (theoretical economics) and the art of economics (applied economics) has disappeared under the impact of the formalist dmodelling method. Indeed, modern economics is defined by little else. This also applies to new fields of research such as evolutionary game-theory and experimental economics which, in other respects, may deviate from neoclassical economics, but not from the use of highly technical model-building.57 **What modern orthodox economists fail to understand is that what is at fault is not some specific assumption or characteristic of the models used, but the method of deductive-mathematical modelling itself. In addition to their universalistic nature and lack of historical specificity, the method of mathematical-deductive reasoning**, as Lawson has shown, **presupposes**, first, **a closed system in which event-regularities or correlations, ‘that connect events standing in causal sequence, in order to deduce that this event happened because of, or followed from, that event’**58 **occur, and**, second, **the isolated-individual agent**.59 **Because of the erroneous character of both of these presuppositions as far as social and economic phenomena are concerned, mathematical modelling is inappropriate as a leading, let alone an exclusive tool for the analysis of such phenomena. To axiomatic model-building should also be added** another attribute which most (but not all) of these new approaches share with neoclassical economics: **methodological individualism and the emphasis on the individual**.60 Where does all this leave the issue of pluralism? It means that **all approaches and schools that do not accept technical model-building as their method of analysis simply do not get a hearing and are left out of the picture altogether,** being considered unacceptable as scholarly economics. As Colander et al. themselves admit, the elite of the profession is open-minded to new ideas, but closed-minded to alternative methods and approaches. ‘If it’s not modeled, it’s not economics’.61 **This**, however, **is** not true scientific pluralism, ‘a genuinely pluralistic environment’, in Davis’s words,62 but rather what might be called ‘conditional’ or ‘**pseudo-’ pluralism** and, as such, is no pluralism at all. Be that as it may, this transition has brought with it a move away from the ‘holy trinity’ of neoclassical economics – rationality, efficiency and equilibrium – to a more eclectic holy trinity – purposeful behaviour, enlightened self-interest and multiple equilibria.63 According to new findings coming from experimental and behavioural economics, the famous homo economicus of the economist’s imagination is passé. It has been shown experimentally and theoretically that individual behaviour is subject to cognitive and emotional constraints, and new, pro-social elements with regard to human behaviour, such as fairness, reciprocity, altruism, etc., have forcefully entered the picture, making individuals more humane and less like the robotic entities implied by homo economicus.64

**Increases in production efficiency and effectiveness only magnify energy shortages and crises**

**Foster et al. ’10** John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at University of Oregon, Brett Clark, assistant professor of sociology at North Carolina State University, and Richard York, associate professor of sociology at University of Oregon, “Capitalism and the Curse of Energy Efficiency,” Monthly Review, November 2010, Vol. 62, Issue 6, pp. 1-12

The Jevons Paradox is the product of a capitalist economic system that is unable to conserve on a macro scale, geared, as it is, to maximizing the throughput of energy and materials from resource tap to final waste sink. Energy savings in such a system tend to be used as a means for further development of the economic order, generating what Alfred Lotka called the “maximum energy flux,” rather than minimum energy production.34 The deemphasis on absolute (as opposed to relative) energy conservation is built into the nature and logic of capitalism as a system unreservedly devoted to the gods of production and profit. As Marx put it: “Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!”35 Seen in the context of a capitalist society, the Jevons Paradox therefore demonstrates the fallacy of current notions that the environmental problems facing society can be solved by purely technological means. Mainstream environmental economists often refer to “dematerialization,” or the “decoupling” of economic growth, from consumption of greater energy and resources. Growth in energy efficiency is often taken as a concrete indication that the environmental problem is being solved. Yet savings in materials and energy, in the context of a given process of production, as we have seen, are nothing new; they are part of the everyday history of capitalist development.36 Each new steam engine, as Jevons emphasized, was more efficient than the one before. “Raw materials-savings processes,” environmental sociologist Stephen Bunker noted, “are older than the Industrial Revolution, and they have been dynamic throughout the history of capitalism.” Any notion that reduction in material throughput, per unit of national income, is a new phenomenon is therefore “profoundly ahistorical.”37 What is neglected, then, in simplistic notions that increased energy efficiency normally leads to increased energy savings overall, is the reality of the Jevons Paradox relationship—through which energy savings are used to promote new capital formation and the proliferation of commodities, demanding ever greater resources. Rather than an anomaly, the rule that efficiency increases energy and material use is integral to the “regime of capital” itself.38 As stated in The Weight of Nations, an important empirical study of material outflows in recent decades in five industrial nations (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and Japan): “Efficiency gains brought by technology and new management practices have been offset by [increases in] the scale of economic growth.”39

#### Space exploration under capitalism will only magnify inequalities—see Blade Runner—the alt is the only hope for equitable space travel

Dickens ’10 Peter Dickens, “The Humanization of the Cosmos—To What End?” Monthly Review, Vol. 62, Issue 6, November 2010, <http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/the-humanization-of-the-cosmos-to-what-end>

Society is increasingly humanizing the cosmos. Satellites have for some time been central to the flow of information, to surveillance, and to the conduct of warfare. As these examples suggest, however, the humanization of the cosmos is primarily benefiting the powerful. These include major economic and military institutions. Furthermore, the forthcoming commodification and colonization of the cosmos is again likely to enhance the interests of the powerful, the major aerospace companies in particular. The time has come to consider alternative forms of cosmic humanization. These would enhance the prospects of the socially marginalized. They would also allow humanity to develop a better understanding of the cosmos and our relationship to it.[1](http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/the-humanization-of-the-cosmos-to-what-end#en85) Humanizing Outer Space The 1969 Apollo 11 moon landing is often seen as the high point of society’s relationship with outer space. Nothing quite so dramatic or exotic seems to have happened in outer space since. But nearby, parts of the solar system (including the moon, some asteroids, and Mars) are now being routinely circled and explored and analyzed by robots. Furthermore, President Obama has recently made important announcements regarding a new U.S. space program that involves manned missions to Mars by the mid-2030s. But the NASA-based Constellation program to the moon and Mars has been cancelled. Instead, NASA will undertake a long-term research and development program aimed at supporting future forms of propulsion and exploration programs. Even more significant in the short-term is a proposed $25 billion being allocated to NASA to kick-start commercial manned spaceflight over the next five years. New forms of transport to the International Space Station will be funded, this time using innovative forms of “space taxis” designed by private sector space companies.[2](http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/the-humanization-of-the-cosmos-to-what-end#en84) These plans entail new relations between the private and public sectors in the United States. Meanwhile, a presence in outer space is being developed by other societies. This is partly because such a presence is seen as an important symbol of modernization, progress, and social unity. The Indian government has announced a manned mission to the moon in 2013, the European Space Agency envisages projects to the moon and beyond, and the Chinese government is planning a similar project for 2020. This last development has caused some consternation over Obama’s plans. One suggestion is that the United States may after all be the next to send manned missions to the moon, because China’s space project is seen by some as a military threat that needs forestalling.[3](http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/the-humanization-of-the-cosmos-to-what-end#en83) Yet among these plans and proposals, it is easy to forget that outer space is already being increasingly humanized. It has now been made an integral part of the way global capitalist society is organized and extended. Satellites, for example, are extremely important elements of contemporary communications systems. These have enabled an increasing number of people to become part of the labor market. Teleworking is the best known example. Satellite-based communications have also facilitated new forms of consumption such as teleshopping. Without satellite-based communications, the global economy in its present form would grind to a halt. Satellites have also been made central to modern warfare. Combined with pilotless Predator drones, they are now being used to observe and attack Taliban and Al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This action is done by remote control from Creech Air Force Base at Indian Springs, Nevada. The 1980s Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars” program, aimed to intercept incoming missiles while facilitating devastating attacks on supposed enemies. A version of the program is still being developed, with the citizens of the Czech Republic and Poland now under pressure to accept parts of a U.S.-designed “missile defense shield.” This is part of a wider strategy of “Full Spectrum Dominance,” which has for some time been official U.S. Defense Policy.[4](http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/the-humanization-of-the-cosmos-to-what-end#en82) Using surveillance and military equipment located in outer space is now seen as the prime means of protecting U.S. economic and military assets both on Earth and in outer space. Less dangerously, but still very expensively, a full-scale space-tourism industry has for some time been under active development. Dennis Tito, a multi-millionaire, made the first tourist trip into outer space in 2001. Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic has now sold over three hundred seats at $200,000 apiece to its first tourists in outer space. The program is due to start in 2011, with spaceports for this novel form of travel now being built in Alaska, California, Florida, New Mexico, Virginia, Wisconsin, the United Arab Emirates, and Esrange in Sweden. Excursions circling the moon, likely to cost the galactic visitors around $100,000,000, are now under development. Since the Renaissance period of the sixteenth century, the word “humanization” has been used to connote something beneficial, especially to human beings. As we will now see, humanizing the cosmos is regarded in just these terms by some influential proponents of space travel and space colonization. The Space Renaissance Initiative One response to cosmic humanization is to welcome it as an early stage of a wholly beneficial cosmic human society, one eventually encompassing the solar system and beyond. Such is the view of the Space Renaissance Initiative, an international group of over seventy private organizations now promoting the expansion of society into the cosmos. The aims and ideals of the Space Renaissance are made clear by the Initiative’s manifesto published in 2010. It reads: Help the Space Economy Revolution! The global economy is entering a deep crisis, the worst since 1929. This is the second act of the “Crisis of Closed-World Ideologies”, which has been developing throughout the 20thcentury. In 1989 the fall of the Berlin wall was the Crisis of Collectivist Ideology. The recent massive failure of the financial system is the Crisis of Neo-Liberal Ideology. Both these ideologies failed because they are based upon a closed-world, terro-centric philosophy. There are now almost 7 billion humans making massive demands on planet Earth: we urgently need to open the frontier, and move to a wider vision of our world, so as to access geo-lunar system resources and energy. In short we need a new “Open World Philosophy”. The alternative would be the implosion and collapse of our civilization.[5](http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/the-humanization-of-the-cosmos-to-what-end#en81) In short, the Space Renaissance Initiative argues, society is undergoing massive social, environmental, and population crises because it is thinking too small. The energy of the sun can, for example, be made into a source of clean power from outer space, which would solve society’s energy shortages at a stroke. The Initiative argues that opening up the cosmos to humanity—colonizing the solar system, and opening up resources in the moon, Mars, and the asteroids—could be central to social and environmental salvation. The progress made by the private sector in developing technologies and efficiencies for space tourism means that commercial enterprise can now start planning to venture still further afield. The philosophical roots of the Space Initiative are no less than the sixteenth-century Italian Renaissance and the Enlightenment. With the enlightened patronage of such families as the Medicis, an unprecedented new age of development took place: arts knew a wonderful age of innovation, culture took on some essential principles of classical Greek philosophy, and modern science was born, with men like Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, and later Copernicus and Galileo leading the way. This movement led to the Age of Enlightenment and its most famous offspring: the American and French Revolutions. The manifesto also praises the writings of Descartes, Voltaire, and Jefferson. The belief of these philosophers in the enterprising individual, in freedom, in liberty, and in reason all mean that political power should be vested in the common person and not in states, kings, and nobility. The Space Renaissance Initiative believes in these concepts, seeing them as the basis of a new, progressive, liberating, humanization of the cosmos. But there are surely major problems here. For example, any claim that the Medici family (and similar families such as the Borgias) helped overthrow feudalism is far-fetched. The Medicis were bankers and merchants who made their money at the center of an emerging global mercantilist capitalism, one based in Northern Italy. They used this money to enhance their position within their feudal societies. Members of the Medicis even made themselves into popes, thus further enhancing their wealth and that of their many illegitimate offspring. Another of the Medicis was made the Queen of France. The language used by intellectual elites of the day was Latin. This appealed to scholars across Europe but not to the great mass of individuals living in Florence, Milan, or Venice.[6](http://monthlyreview.org/2010/11/01/the-humanization-of-the-cosmos-to-what-end#en80) The Medicis and individuals such as Leonardo are often celebrated as examples of “The Renaissance Universal Man,” one capable of spanning every kind of human practice such as art, music, and politics. This “Man” is perhaps best symbolized by Leonardo’s famous image of a male human being, stretched over the circle of the cosmos, his head in the heavens and his bowels located in earthly regions. But this Renaissance Man—or Woman—can also be seen as prefiguring the self-centered, narcissistic individualism of our own day, one seeing the whole of the cosmos at his or her command. This kind of modern human identity has since been enhanced by consumer-based capitalism and, given the problems it creates both for ourselves and our environment, there seems rather little reason to celebrate or restore it. The general point is that the vision of the Space Renaissance Initiative, with its prime focus on the power of the supposedly autonomous and inventive individual, systematically omits questions of social, economic, and military power. Similarly, the Initiative’s focus on the apparently universal benefits of space humanization ignores some obvious questions. What will ploughing large amounts of capital into outer space colonization really do for stopping the exploitation of people and resources back here on earth? The “solution” seems to be simultaneously exacerbating social problems while jetting away from them. Consumer-led industrial capitalism necessarily creates huge social divisions and increasing degradation of the environment. Why should a galactic capitalism do otherwise? The Space Renaissance Initiative argues that space-humanization is necessarily a good thing for the environment by introducing new space-based technologies such as massive arrays of solar panels. But such “solutions” are again imaginary. Cheap electricity is most likely to increase levels of production and consumption back on earth. Environmental degradation will be exacerbated rather than diminished by this technological fix. A simplistic and idealistic view of history, technology, and human agency therefore underpins the starting point of the Space Renaissance Initiative. Humanization in this shape—one now finding favor in official government circles—raises all kinds of highly problematic issues for society and the environment. What would an alternative, more critical, perspective on humanizing the cosmos tell us?

#### Imperialism is necessitated by the growth imperative—hegemony conceals the worst of socioeconomic exploitation and justifies constant interventionism

Meszaros ‘7 Istvan Meszaros, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and Professor Emeritus at U. Sussex. “The Only Viable Economy,” Monthly Review, 2007 http://www.monthlyreview.org/0407meszaros.htm

The quixotic advocacy of freezing production at the level attained in the early 1970s was trying to camouflage, with vacuous pseudo-scientific model-mongering pioneered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the ruthlessly enforced actual power relations of U.S. dominated postwar imperialism.  That variety of imperialism was, of course, very different from its earlier form known to Lenin.  For in Lenin's lifetime at least half a dozen significant imperialist powers were competing for the rewards of their real and/or hoped for conquests.  And even in the 1930s Hitler was still willing to share the fruits of violently redefined imperialism with Japan and Mussolini's Italy.  In our time, by contrast, we have to face up to the reality -- and the lethal dangers -- arising from global hegemonic imperialism, with the United States as its overwhelmingly dominant power.[7](http://www.monthlyreview.org/0407meszaros.htm" \l "_edn7" \t "_blank)  In contrast to even Hitler, the United States as the single hegemon is quite unwilling to share global domination with any rival.  And that is not simply on account of political/military contingencies.  The problems are much deeper.  They assert themselves through the ever-aggravating contradictions of the capital system's deepening structural crisis.  U.S. dominated global hegemonic imperialism is an -- ultimately futile -- attempt to devise a solution to that crisis through the most brutal and violent rule over the rest of the world, enforced with or without the help of slavishly "willing allies," now through a succession of genocidal wars.  Ever since the 1970s the United States has been sinking ever deeper into catastrophic indebtedness.  The fantasy solution publicly proclaimed by several U.S. presidents was "to grow out of it."  And the result: the diametrical opposite, in the form of astronomical and still growing indebtedness.  Accordingly, the United States must grab to itself, by any means at its disposal, including the most violent military aggression, whenever required for this purpose, everything it can, through the transfer of the fruits of capitalist growth -- thanks to the global socioeconomic and political/military domination of the United States -- from everywhere in the world.  Could then any sane person imagine, no matter how well armored by his or her callous contempt for "the shibboleth of equality," that U.S. dominated global hegemonic imperialism would take seriously even for a moment the panacea of "no growth"?  Only the worst kind of bad faith could suggest such ideas, no matter how pretentiously packaged in the hypocritical concern over "the Predicament of Mankind." For a variety of reasons there can be no question about the importance of growth both in the present and in the future.  But to say so must go with a proper examination of the concept of growth not only as we know it up to the present, but also as we can envisage its sustainability in the future.  Our siding with the need for growth cannot be in favor of unqualified growth.  The tendentiously avoided real question is: what kind of growth is both feasible today, in contrast to dangerously wasteful and even crippling capitalist growth visible all around us?  For growth must be also positively sustainable in the future on a long-term basis.

**Try or die—capitalism causes resource wars, economic collapses, population crises, ecological degradation, kills value to life, and magnifies all secondary antagonisms**

**Parr ’13** Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital, 2013, p. 145-147

**A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry** reported in 2010; as of 2005, **the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on**.2 **Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it?** Well it is. It is shameful to think that **massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs**.3 **The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation.** Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 **Once we move higher than 2°C of warming**, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, **positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We** therefore **need to start thinking very differently right now.** We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on Decembe . r i6, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism:'s **The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose**.6 **Adaptability, modifications, and displacement**, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, **constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat.** Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, **one gives up on one's autonomy** and reverts to being a child. **Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness**. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure-myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage- outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. **There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope.** In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that **each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic**. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: **our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.**

**No turns—capitalism tends toward stagnation—market interventions and innovative spurts continually magnify structural contradictions**

**Foster and McChesney ’12** John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at University of Oregon, and Robert W. McChesney, Gutgsell Endowed Professor of Communication, University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign, “The Endless Crisis,” Monthly Review, May 2012, vol. 64, issue 1, pp. 1-28

Nearly twenty years later, Sweezy, writing with Paul Baran, published their now classic study, Monopoly Capital, which was to have a strong influence on New Left economics in the 1970s. “The normal state of the monopoly capitalist economy,” they declared, “is stagnation.”28 According to this argument, the rise of the giant monopolistic (or oligopolistic) corporations had led to a tendency for the actual and potential investment-seeking surplus in society to rise. The very conditions of exploitation (or high price markups on unit labor costs) meant both that inequality in society increased and that more and more surplus capital tended to accumulate actually and potentially within the giant firms and in the hands of wealthy investors, who were unable to find profitable investment outlets sufficient to absorb all of the investment-seeking surplus. Hence, the economy became increasingly dependent on external stimuli such as higher government spending (particularly on the military), a rising sales effort, and financial expansion to maintain growth.29 Such external stimuli, as Sweezy was later to explain, were “not part of the internal logic of the economy itself,” falling “outside the scope of mainstream economics from which historical, political, and sociological considerations are carefully excluded.”30 All of these external stimuli were self-limiting, and/or generated further long-run contradictions, leading to the resumption of stagnation tendencies. Sending capital investment abroad did little to abate the problem since the return flow of profits and other business returns, under conditions of unequal exchange between global North and South and U.S. hegemony in general, tended to overwhelm the outward flow. A truly epoch-making innovation, playing the role of the steam engine, the railroad, or the automobile in the nineteenth and early-to-midtwentieth centuries, might alter the situation. But such history-changing innovations of the kind that would alter the entire geography and scale of accumulation were not to be counted on and were probably less likely under mature monopoly-capitalist conditions. The result was that the economy, despite its ordinary ups and downs, tended to sink into a normal state of long-run slow growth, rather than the robust growth assumed by orthodox economics. In essence an economy in which decisions on savings and investment are made privately tends to fall into a stagnation trap: existing demand is insufficient to absorb all of the actual and potential savings (or surplus) available, output falls, and there is no automatic mechanism that generates full recovery.31 Stagnation theory, in this sense, did not mean that strong economic growth for a time was impossible in mature capitalist economies—simply that stagnation was the normal case and that robust growth had to be explained as the result of special historical factors. This reversed the logic characteristic of neoclassical economics, which assumed that rapid growth was natural under capitalism, except when outside forces, such as the state or trade unions, interfered with the smooth operation of the market. Stagnation also did not necessarily mean deep downturns with negative growth, but rather a slowing down of the trend-rate of growth due to overaccumulation. Net investment (i.e., investment beyond that covered by depreciation funds) atrophied, since with rising productivity what little investment was called for could be met through depreciation funds alone. Stagnation thus assumed steady technological progress and rising productivity as its basis. It was not that the economy was not productive enough; rather it was **too productive** to absorb the entire investment-seeking surplus generated within production.

**Vote negative to endorse Marxist labor theory of value.**

**Increasing contradictions of capital necessitate a new approach. Focus on material production is key to social praxis.**

**Tumino ’12** Stephen Tumino, more marxist than Marx himself, “Is Occupy Wall Street Communist,” Red Critique 14, Winter/Spring 2012, http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/isoccupywallstreetcommunist.htm

Leaving aside that the purpose of Wolff's speech was to popularize a messianic vision of a more just society based on workplace democracy, he is right about one thing: Marx's original contribution to the idea of communism is that it is an historical and material movement produced by the failure of capitalism not a moral crusade to reform it. Today we are confronted with the fact that capitalism has failed in exactly the way that Marx explained was inevitable.[4] It has "simplified the class antagonism" (The Communist Manifesto); by concentrating wealth and centralizing power in the hands of a few it has succeeded in dispossessing the masses of people of everything except their labor power. As a result it has revealed that the ruling class "is unfit to rule," as The Communist Manifesto concludes, "because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him." And the slaves are thus compelled to fight back. Capitalism makes communism necessary because it has brought into being an international working class whose common conditions of life give them not only the need but also the economic power to establish a society in which the rule is "from each according to their ability, to each according to their need" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme). Until and unless we confront the fact that capitalism has once again brought the world to the point of taking sides for or against the system as a whole, communism will continue to be just a bogey-man or a nursery-tale to frighten and soothe the conscience of the owners rather than what it is—the materialist theory that is an absolute requirement for our emancipation from exploitation and a new society freed from necessity! As Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" (What Is To Be Done?). We are confronted with an historic crisis of global proportions that demands of us that we take Marxism seriously as something that needs to be studied to find solutions to the problems of today. Perhaps then we can even begin to understand communism in the way that The Communist Manifesto presents it as "the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority" to end inequality forever.

**Totalizing analysis is key to environmentalism—only critique offers hope of escape from ecological devastation**

**Magdoff ’12** Fred Magdoff, Professor emeritus of plant and soil science at the Unviersity of Vermont, “Harmony and Ecological Civilization,” Monthly Review, June 2012, Vol. 64, Issue 2, p. 1-9

Nevertheless, **for many the role that capitalism plays in ecological destruction is invisible. Thus the ecological and social antagonisms and contradictions** of capitalism are frequently misdiagnosed. Some observers suggest that many of these problems are caused by the rise of industrial society. Here, so the thinking goes, any society based on or using industrial production will necessarily have the same resource and environmental problems. Others blame the thoughtless exploitation of natural resources and the great damage done to the environment on the existence of too many people. The large population, exceeding the carrying capacity of the planet, they maintain, is the culprit and the solution is therefore to reduce the population of the earth as quickly as possible. (Not easy to do of course by humane means.) Some ahistorical commentators say the problem is endemic to humans because we are inherently greedy and acquisitive. With a few important exceptions, non-Marxist discussions of the problems neglect to even look at the characteristics and workings of capitalism, let alone examine them at any depth. They are so embedded in the system, that they assume that capitalism, which many mislabel “the market economy,” will go on and on forever—even, it is illogically assumed, if we destroy the earth itself as a place of human habitation—while any other type of economic system is absolutely inconceivable. Economic, societal, and historical contexts are completely ignored. Rational and useful alternative solutions to any problem depend upon a realistic analysis and diagnosis as to what is causing it to occur. When such analysis is lacking substance the proposed “solutions” will most likely be useless. For example, there are people fixated on nonrenewable resource depletion that is caused, in their opinion, by “overpopulation.” Thus, they propose, as the one and only “solution,” a rapid “degrowth” of the world’s population. Programs that provide contraceptives to women in poor countries are therefore offered as an important tool to solving the global ecological problem. However, those concerned with there being too many people generally do not discuss the economic system that is so destructive to the environment and people or the critical moral and practical issue of the vast inequalities created by capitalism. Even the way that capitalism itself requires population growth as part of its overall expansion is ignored. Thus, a critical aspect almost always missing from discussions by those concerned with population as it affects resource use and pollution is that the overwhelming majority of the earth’s environmental problems are caused by the wealthy and their lifestyles—and by a system of capital accumulation that predominantly serves their interests. The World Bank staff estimates that the wealthiest 10 percent of humanity are responsible for approximately 60 percent of all resource use and therefore 60 percent of the pollution (most probably an underestimate). Commentators fixated on nonrenewable resources and pollution as the overriding issues cannot see that one of their main “solutions”—promoting birth control in poor countries—gets nowhere near to even beginning to address the real problem. It should go without saying that poor people should have access to medical services, including those involving family planning. This should be considered a basic human right. The rights of women in this respect are one of the key indicators of democratic and human development. But how can people fixated on the mere population numbers ignore the fact that it is the world’s affluent classes that account for the great bulk of those problems—whether one is looking at resource use, consumption, waste, or environmental pollution—that are considered so important to the survival of society and even humanity? In addition to the vast quantity of resources used and pollution caused by wealthy individuals, governments are also responsible. The U.S. military is one of the world’s prime users of resources—from oil to copper, zinc, tin, and rare earths. The military is also is the single largest consumer of energy in the United States.5 While capitalism creates many of the features and relationships discussed above, we must keep in mind that long before capitalism existed there were negative societal aspects such as warfare, exploitation of people and resources, and ecological damage. However, capitalism solidifies and makes these problems systemic while at the same time creating other negative aspects.

**Evaluate the debate as a dialectical materialist—you are a historian inquiring into the determinant factors behind the 1AC—Marx’s labor theory of value is the best possible description**

**Tumino ‘1** Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before,” Red Critique, Spring 2001, http://redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory. Finally, it is only Orthodox Marxism that recognizes the inevitability and also the necessity of communism—the necessity, that is, of a society in which "from each according to their ability to each according to their needs" (Marx) is the rule.

**Particular facts are irrelevant without totalizing historical theory—the aff makes universal what is particular to capitalism—methodological inquiry is prior to action**

**Lukács ’67** György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, MIT Press: Cambridge, 1967, p. 7-10

Thus we perceive that there is something highly problematic in the fact that capitalist society is predisposed to harmonise with scientific method, to constitute indeed the social premises of its exactness. If the internal structure of the 'facts' of their interconnections is essentially historical, if, that is to say, they are caught up in a process of continuous transformation, then we may indeed question when the greater scientific inaccuracy occurs. It is when I conceive of the 'facts' as existing in a form and as subject to laws concerning which I have a methodological certainty (or at least probability) that they no longer apply to these facts? Or is it when I consciously take this situation into account, cast a critical eye at the 'exactitude' attainable by such a method and concentrate instead on those points where this historical aspect, this decisive fact of change really manifests itself? The historical character of the 'facts' which science seems to have grasped with such 'purity' makes itself felt in an even more devastating manner. As the products of historical evolution they are involved in continuous change. But in addition they are also precisely in their objective structure the products of a definite historical epoch, namely capitalism. Thus when 'science' maintains that the manner in which data immediately present themselves is an adequate foundation of scientific conceptualisation and that the actual form of these data is the appropriate starting point for the formation of scientific concepts, it thereby takes its stand simply and dogmatically on the basis of capitalist society. It uncritically accepts the nature of the object as it is given and the laws of that society as the unalterable foundation of 'science'. In order to progress from these 'facts' to facts in the true meaning of the word it is necessary to perceive **their historical conditioning** as such and to abandon the point of view that would see them as immediately given: they must themselves be subjected to a historical and dialectical examination. For as Marx says:8 "The finished pattern of economic relations as seen on the surface in their real existence and consequently in the ideas with which the agents and bearers of these relations seek to understand them, is very different from, and indeed quite the reverse of and antagonistic to their inner, essential but concealed core and the concepts corresponding to it." If the facts are to be understood, this distinction between their real existence and their inner core must be grasped clearly and precisely. This distinction is the first premise of a truly scientific study which in Marx's words, "would be superfluous if the outward appearance of things coincided with their essence" .10 Thus we must detach the phenomena from the form in which they are immediately given and discover the intervening links which connect them to their core, their essence. In so doing, we shall arrive at an understanding of their apparent form and see it as the form in which the inner core necessarily appears. It is necessary because of the historical character of the facts, because they have grown in the soil of capitalist society. This twofold character, the simultaneous recognition and transcendence of immediate appearances is precisely the dialectical nexus. In this respect, superficial readers imprisoned in the modes of thought created by capitalism, experienced the gravest difficulties in comprehending the structure of thought in Capital. For on the one hand, Marx's account pushes the capitalist nature of all economic forms to their furthest limits, he creates an intellectual milieu where they can exist in their purest form by positing a society 'corresponding to the theory', i.e. capitalist through and through, consisting of none but capitalists and proletarians. But conversely, no sooner does this strategy produce results, no sooner does this world of phenomena seem to be on the point of crystallising out into theory than it dissolves into a mere illusion, a distorted situation appears as in a distorting mirror which is, however, "only the conscious expression of an imaginary movement". Only in this context which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and integrates them in a totality, can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge of reality. This knowledge starts from the simple (and to the capitalist world), pure, immediate, natural determinants described above. It progresses from them to the knowledge of the concrete totality, i.e. to the conceptual reproduction of reality. This concrete totality is by no means an unmediated datum for thought. "The concrete is concrete," Marx says,11 "because it is a synthesis of many particular determinants, i.e. a unity of diverse elements." Idealism succumbs here to the delusion of confusing the intellectual reproduction of reality with the actual structure of reality itself. For "in thought, reality appears as the process of synthesis, not as starting-point, but as outcome, although it is the real starting-point and hence the starting-point for perception and ideas." Conversely, the vulgar materialists, even in the modem guise donned by Bernstein and others, do not go beyond the reproduction of the immediate, simple determinants of social life. They imagine that they are being quite extraordinarily 'exact' when they simply take over these determinants without either analysing them further or welding them into a concrete totality. They take the facts in abstract isolation, explaining them only in terms of abstract laws unrelated to the concrete totality. As Marx observes: "Crudeness and conceptual nullity consist in the tendency to forge arbitrary unmediated connections between things that belong together in an organic union." 12 The crudeness and conceptual nullity of such thought lies primarily in the fact that it obscures the historical, transitory nature of capitalist society. Its determinants take on the appearance of timeless, eternal categories valid for all social formations. This could be seen at its crassest in the vulgar bourgeois economists, but the vulgar Marxists soon followed in their footsteps. The dialectical method was overthrown and with it the methodological supremacy of the totality over the individual aspects; the parts were prevented from finding their definition within the whole and, instead, the whole was dismissed as unscientific or else it degenerated into the mere 'idea' or 'sum' of the parts. With the totality out of the way, the fetishistic relations of the isolated parts appeared as a timeless law valid for every human society. Marx's dictum: "The relations of production of every society form a whole" 13 is the methodological point of departure and the key to the historical understanding of social relations. All the isolated partial categories can be thought of and treated-in isolation-as something that is always present in every society. (If it cannot be found in a given society this is put down to 'chance as the exception that proves the rule.) But the changes to which these individual aspects are subject give no clear and unambiguous picture of the real differences in the various stages of the evolution of society. These can really only be discerned in the context of the total historical process of their relation to society as a whole.

#### The free market is a myth—corporatization constrains all of their impact turns

Mendoza ’13 Kerry-Anne Mendoza, “THE MYTH OF THE FREE MARKET: YOU’LL FIND A UNICORN BEFORE YOU FIND A FREE MARKET,” Climate & Capitalism, 2/28/2013, http://climateandcapitalism.com/2013/02/28/like-unicorns-the-free-market-is-a-myth

While arguments in favour of inviting private interests into the public services rests on the idea of competition, corporations themselves are rabidly anti-competition. If a McDonalds opens opposite a Burger King, Burger King aren’t over the moon that the capitalist theory of competition is being exercised, they’re figuring out how to kill the opposition. The argument goes that the consumer is the ultimate beneficiary of this struggle, as the consumer will be tempted by lower prices and better quality goods to win them over. These arguments overlook some key issues. They ignore that it makes sense for the corporation to seek out a monopoly – so a free market gained monopoly would have no different traits than a socialised monopoly – except democratic accountability would be removed. They also fail to consider that the consumer is not solely a consumer, they are also a member of their society so may well be impacted by the competition in more than one way (i.e. they might benefit from a price cut as a consumer, but lose their job as a result of the bigger corporation pushing their employer out of the market). The facts bear this theory out. With the rise in ‘free market’ policies of the Thatcher and Reagan governments in 1980’s US and UK, perhaps we would see a dramatic rise in competition? Surely this new, free market would end monopolies and usher in a new era of dynamic, consumer responsive businesses vying for attention. Let us use food as a case study. In 1990, only 10-20 percent of global food retail was delivered by supermarkets. Today, that figure has soared to 50-60 percent. That is, over half of all food sold in the world, is sold through supermarkets. The UK has lost 90% of its specialists food retailers – that is butchers, bakers and fisheries – since the 1950’s. In Britain today, 97% of food purchased, is bought in supermarkets, with only four corporations making up 76% of those sales. In the US, 72% of food is purchased in supermarkets. As these figures continue an upward trend, we can see that monopolies are being created in food production. If we take a look and test the theory that the consumer would benefit from this process of corporate battle, proponents of the idea point to the drop in the proportion of household budgets in developed countries spent on food. During the rise of the supermarket since the 1950s, the percentage of the US household budget spent on food dropped from 32% to 7%. In the UK the proportion spent on food has dropped from 33% to 15%. But, with supermarkets making record profits, and household food budgets down, who is paying the price for our food? The answer is the farmer and the environment. In Brazil, more than 75,000 farmers have been delisted by the big supermarkets. Thailand’s top supermarket chain has carved its supplier list from 250 to just ten. The tiny country of Lesotho has actually all but killed off its domestic farming industry with 99% ofits food purchased through supermarkets utilising foreign agri-business. Seventy years ago, there were nearly seven million American farmers, today there are two million. Between 1987 and 1992 the US lost 32,500 farms a year and now 75% of US produce comes from just 50,000 farming operations. Family farming and smallholding has been the big victim of the supermarkets. This means farmers in developing countries being exploited, and consumers in developed countries so far removed from their food chain that they could not tell the difference between beef and horse. The inflation in food prices in recent years has been masked not only by supermarkets pressurising food producers to ever decreasing incomes and unsustainable farming practices, but the makeup of our food is being diluted…in short, the price might stay the same but we are getting less for that price. The still breaking horse meat scandal is just one example of this.

### 1

#### Squo solves and no impact

Buttersworth ’11 Dr. Robert Buttersworth, President of Aries analytics, a company which provides market analyses and program development services to government, commercial and non-profit clients concerning space and space-related research and development, has served on the staff of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and at the Department of Defense, was responsible for the review and oversight activities, budget support and program analyses for selected space and intelligence activities, “Obama Administration's 'Three Cs' Means a Failing Space Policy,” AOL Defense, 7 November 2011, <http://defense.aol.com/2011/11/07/obama-administrations-three-cs-means-a-failing-space-policy/>

Consider, for example, the first "c:" Is space becoming increasingly congested? The US government says publicly that there are some 17,000 things that are 10 centimeters or bigger and many more items that are smaller orbiting the earth. That's a lot, but those numbers say nothing about congestion. For travel purposes, I don't care how many cars there are in northern Virginia; I care how many are on the road at the same time and place as I. The relevant question is not congestion but whether the probability of collision is increasing, and at least one informal study suggests it has not changed over the past decade or so. That finding might be due in part to better information about the what/where/when of space objects; if so, it suggests that orbital conjunctions are already being managed successfully, due primarily to conjunction analyses and collision warnings provided by U.S. Strategic Command. As explained in a recent Time magazine article, the risk of accidents "is minimized by the fact that all objects orbiting at the same altitude also move at the same speed." The Defense Department publication also mentions congestion in the electromagnetic spectrum, but there are longstanding measures to address both intentional and unintentional interference in this domain. From a defense perspective growth in the orbital population is not all bad. As the environment gets more complicated, relative military advantage will accrue to the superior ability to identify and track objects and to conduct sophisticated maneuvers on orbit with great precision. In these capabilities the U.S. is generally ahead of potential antagonists and should be able to make it increasingly difficult for adversaries to identify, track, and target militarily critical satellites.

#### Russia’s constrained from war

Weitz ’11 Richard Weitz, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” 9/27/2011

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

#### No space war—deterrence, debris hazards, lower-scale conflict more likely

Weston ‘9 Major Scott A. Weston, USAF, MS from Troy University and MA from the Naval Postgraduate School, attending Joint Military Attache School en route to serving as the assistant air attaché to the Republic of the Philippines, has led combat and combat-support missions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, “Examining space warfare: scenarios, risks, and US Policy implications,” Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2009, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0NXL/is\_1\_23/ai\_n31526665/?tag=content;col1

As mentioned in the RAND war-game scenario, China would be far less affected than the United States by the loss of most space assets at this point because its air-breathing ISR assets could cover the immediate theater and short-range ground communications that do not rely upon satellites. (37) Conversely, once US forces have deployed, they would rely heavily upon space assets. In a limited military engagement such as this, it is unlikely that the United States would attempt to facilitate ISR flights by establishing air superiority over all of China. US forces would thus remain highly reliant upon satellites for ISR over mainland China and for communication with the homeland and between deployed units. The RAND study also pointed out that China would likely contract commercial third-party space assets to provide needed capabilities, complicating repercussions from US attacks. All told, counterspace operations would probably prove as discriminate as possible to prevent strategic escalation. Both sides would hesitate to utilize kinetic-kill ASATs against anything but very low-altitude satellites for fear of incurring international condemnation and increasing debris hazards for their own resources. (38) In all likelihood, the United States would not use its kinetic ASAT capability, preferring to utilize its limited number of sea-based Standard Missile 3s for ABM defense of forward-deployed forces. Thus, the number of satellites destroyed or permanently disabled would be very low. As limited as this scenario appears, it bears out realistic actions taken under current policy and doctrine, given the resources available to each side. In this case, it is difficult to see how even one of our most capable space adversaries would have either the capability or the motivation to attempt a surprise attack on US space assets that would rise to the level of a space Pearl Harbor. It is also difficult to understand how the cost of deploying hundreds or even thousands of US weapon satellites to ensure space dominance would greatly affect the outcome of this scenario. Even a deployed space-based missile-defense shield probably would not encourage the United States to intentionally escalate a limited regional conflict with another nuclear power to a full nuclear exchange if there were any risk of nuclear warheads reaching US soil.

#### Transition is peaceful—empirics and structural theory

MacDonald and Parent ’11 Paul K. MacDonald, professor of political science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, “Graceful Decline?” International Security, Vol. 35, Iss. 4, Spring 2011

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by deªnition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

#### Bioweapons don’t cause extinction—natural resistance and health tech solves

Easterbrook ‘3 Gregg Easterbrook, editor of The New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!” Wired, July 2003, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html

3. Germ warfare! Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn't kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today's Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

#### NASA’s producing PU238 again

Hruska 3-15 Joel Hruska, “To the stars: After a 25 year hiatus, NASA restarts plutonium production,” ExtremeTech, 3/15/2013, http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/150756-to-the-stars-after-a-25-year-hiatus-nasa-restarts-plutonium-production

After a quarter-century hiatus, the United States has begun producing plutonium-238 once more. The decision was made to ensure that future NASA projects would have access to the valuable fuel. As US stocks dwindled, NASA began buying plutonium-238 from Russia, but that agreement came to an end in 2010. When most people think of plutonium, they think of nuclear weapons — but that’s not what plutonium-238 is used for. If you need a power source that can last for decades, plutonium-238 is fantastically useful stuff. It’s got a half life of nearly 88 years and it emits 560 watts of heat per kilogram of material. It’s a vital component of the radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) used on Curiosity and in a number of space probes, including Cassini. One of the best features of plutonium-238 is that, while it’s radioactive as hell (275 times more so than plutonium-239, it takes a minimal amount of shielding to protect spacecraft or humans from contamination. Plutonium-powered pacemakers (yes, that was a thing for a little while) have operated as long as 25 years without running out of power. The schedule drawn up by NASA and the Department of Energy doesn’t call for much production; the organization is hoping to create approximately 1.5 kilograms (3.3 lbs) a year. NASA has found that it can hit its energy density targets by mixing some of its older plutonium stock at a ratio of 1:2 — another important factor. One of the most basic challenges of building probes and spacecraft for deep space exploration is the need to keep the vehicles supplied with enough power. In many cases, solar panels simply aren’t an option — they’re difficult to keep clean and their power output falls as a probe’s distance from the Sun increases. One of the upcoming missions that will require a plutonium-powered RTG is the Curiosity follow-up, which will see another Curiosity-like rover deposited on Mars (via sky crane!), hopefully by 2020.

### 2

#### Colonization’s inevitable and there’s no rush—prefer specific scenarios for extinction

Baum ’10 Seth D. Baum, M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Northeastern University, Research Assistant in the Rock Ethics Institute at Pennsylvania State University, “Is Humanity Doomed? Insights from Astrobiology” Sustainability, Volume 2, 2010, p. 600, www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/2/2/591/pdf

The fact that the universe will remain habitable for much longer than Earth will means that, if we care about long-term sustainability, then it is extremely important for us to colonize space [38]. Colonizing space will permit us to take advantage of all that the rest of the universe has to offer [39]. But this does not mean that we should focus our current efforts on space colonization. The reason for this is simple: Earth will remain habitable for another billion years or so. While a billion years is quite small compared to the universe’s lifetime, it is quite large compared to the amount of time it probably takes to colonize space, especially given our current rapid rates of technological change. If we are to colonize space before the world ends, then we have plenty of time to do it—as long as nothing really bad happens first. These “really bad” things can be any global catastrophe so large that it would permanently eliminate our capacity to colonize space before the world ends. Several phenomena may be so catastrophic, including nuclear warfare, pandemic outbreaks, ecological collapse, disruptive technology, and of course impact from a large asteroid. Risks of these events have been called global catastrophic risks or existential risks [40]. I will use the term existential risk here because it is our existence that is ultimately at stake. These risks are far more imminent than the end of the world. Therefore, if we care about long-term sustainability, then we should focus our efforts on avoiding these catastrophes, i.e., on reducing existential risk, so that future generations can colonize space.

#### Sustainable colonization is unfeasible

Launius ’10 Roger Launius, PhD, Curator, Planetary Exploration Programs, National Air and Space Museum, expert on Aerospace history, fellow and board member of the American Astronautical Society, “Can we colonize the solar system? Human biology and survival in the extreme space environment,” Endeavour, Vol. 34, Issue 3, September 2010, pp. 122-129

Although microbial life might survive the extreme conditions of space, for Homo sapien sapiens the space environment remains remarkably dangerous to life. One space life scientist, Vadim Rygalov, remarked that ensuring human life during spaceflight was largely about providing the basics of human physiological needs. From the most critical – meaning that its absence would cause immediate death, to the least critical – these include such constants available here on Earth of atmospheric pressure, breathable oxygen, temperature, drinking water, food, gravitational pull on physical systems, radiation mitigation, and others of a less immediate nature. As technologies, and knowledge about them, stand at this time, humans are able to venture into space for short periods of less than a year only by supplying all of these needs either by taking everything with them (oxygen, food, air, etc.) or creating them artificially (pressurized vehicles, centrifugal force to substitute for gravity, etc.).10 Spaceflight would be much easier if humans could go into hibernation during the extremes of spaceflight, as did the Streptococcus mitis bacteria. Resolving these issues has proven difficult but not insurmountable for such basic spaceflight activities as those undertaken during the heroic age of space exploration when the United States and the Soviet Union raced to the Moon. Overcoming the technological hurdles encountered during the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs were child's play in comparison to the threat to human life posed by long duration, deep space missions to such places as Mars. Even the most sophisticated of those, the lunar landings of Project Apollo, were relatively short camping trips on an exceptionally close body in the solar system, and like many camping trips undertaken by Americans the astronauts took with them everything they would need to use while there. This approach will continue to work well until the destination is so far away that resupply from Earth becomes highly problematic if not impossible if the length of time to be gone is so great that resupply proves infeasible. There is no question that the U.S. could return to the Moon in a more dynamic and robust version of Apollo; it could also build a research station there and resupply it from Earth while rotating crews and resupplying from Earth on a regular basis. In this instance, the lunar research station might look something like a more sophisticated and difficult to support version of the Antarctic research stations. A difficult challenge, yes; but certainly it is something that could be accomplished with presently envisioned technologies.11 The real difficulty is that at the point a lunar research station becomes a colony profound changes to the manner in which humans interact with the environment beyond Earth must take place. Countermeasures for core challenges – gravity, radiation, particulates, and ancillary effects – provide serious challenges for humans engaged in space colonization (Figure 4).

#### No Indo-Pak war

Alagappa ‘9 Muthia Alagappa, Distinguished Senior Fellow at the East-West Center and PhD in International Affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Nuclear Weapons Reinforce Security and Stability in 21st Century Asia,” Global Asia, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 2009

The stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons may be better illustrated in India-Pakistan relations, as the crises between these two countries during the 1999–2002 period are often cited as demonstrating nuclear weapon-induced instability. Rather than simply attribute these crises to the possession of nuclear weapons, a more accurate and useful reading would ground them in Pakistan’s deliberate policy to alter the status quo through military means on the premise that the risk of escalation to nuclear war would deter India from responding with full-scale conventional retaliation; and in India’s response, employing compellence and coercive diplomacy strategies. In other words, particular goals and strategies rather than nuclear weapons per se precipitated the crises. Further, the outcomes of these two crises revealed the limited utility of nuclear weapons in bringing about even a minor change in the territorial status quo and highlighted the grave risks associated with offensive strategies. Recognition of these limits and the grave consequences in part contributed to the two countries’ subsequent efforts to engage in a comprehensive dialogue to settle the many disputes between them. The crises also led to bilateral understandings and measures to avoid unintended hostilities. Though it is too soon to take a long view, it is possible to argue that, like the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the 1999 and 2001–02 crises between India and Pakistan mark a watershed in their strategic relations: the danger of nuclear war shifted their focus to avoiding a major war and to finding a negotiated settlement to bilateral problems. Large-scale military deployments along the common border, Pakistan-supported insurgent activities in India, and cross-border terrorism continue; and the two countries regularly conduct large-scale military exercises and test nuclear-capable missiles that have each other’s entire territory within range. Despite these activities, the situation has become relatively less tense; stability with the ability to absorb shocks even like that created by the November 26 terrorist attack in Mumbai has begun to characterize the bilateral relationship.

#### Escalation empirically denied

Drum ‘7 Kevin Drum, “The Chaos Hawk…” The Washington Monthly’s Political Animal Blog, 9/9/07, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007\_09/012029.php

Needless to say, this is nonsense. Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration. The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration. The U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.

#### No water wars—empirics are definitive—scarcity prompts cooperation—their ev is politically charged

Allouche ’11 Jeremy Allouche, research fellow in water supply and sanitation at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, former visiting fellow at MIT’s Center for International Studies and visiting fellow at Oxford’s Center for International Studies, PhD in international relations from the Institute of International Studies in Geneva, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supp. 1, pp. S3-S8, January 2011,

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

# 2NC

## K

### 2NC—Framework [Long]

#### Your decision is not between competing policy options, but between mutually exclusive visions of history. The terminal impact to debate is knowledge production—prefer our dialectical science over their mystification:

#### Primacy—life is determined by material circumstances—experiences are ordered by the economic conditions we’re born into. States of consciousness are intelligible only with references to their prior causes—that’s Tumino. Prior theorization of social totality is key to reveal the systemic necessity of the 1AC impacts.

#### Ideology—capital imposes epistemic blind-spots which bankrupts decision-making—causes us to dismiss radicalism because our limited imaginations are trapped in the status quo. Their impacts are propaganda that you should ignore—that’s Lukacs—they take what is contingent to capitalism and extend it throughout history. Critique is key to objective knowledge.

#### Universality—totalizing theory is key to praxis—otherwise there is no logical basis for action. Also means their activism will be diluted and short-lived.

Lukács ’67 György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, MIT Press: Cambridge, 1967, p. 23-24

The practical danger of every such dualism shows itself in the loss of any directive for action. As soon as you abandon the ground of reality that has been conquered and reconquered by dialectical materialism, as soon as you decide to remain on the 'natural' ground of existence, of the empirical in its stark, naked brutality, you create a gulf between the subject of an action and the milieux of the 'facts' in which the action unfolds so that they stand opposed to each other as harsh, irreconcilable principles. It then becomes impossible to impose the subjective will, wish or decision upon the facts or to discover in them any directive for action. A situation in which the 'facts' speak out unmistakably for or against a definite course of action has never existed, and neither can or will exist. The more conscientiously the facts are explored in their isolation, i.e. in their unmediated relations-the less compellingly will they point in any one direction. It is self-evident that a merely subjective decision will be shattered by the pressure of uncomprehended facts acting automatically 'according to laws'. Thus dialectical materialism is seen to offer the only approach to reality which can give action a direction. The self-knowledge, both subjective and objective, of the proletariat at a given point in its evolution is at the same time knowledge of the stage of development achieved by the whole society. The facts no longer appear strange when they are comprehended in their coherent reality, in the relation of all partial aspects to their inherent, but hitherto unelucidated roots in the whole: we then perceive the tendencies which strive towards the centre of reality, to what we are wont to call the ultimate goal. This ultimate goal is not an abstract ideal opposed to the process, but an aspect of truth and reality. It is the concrete meaning of each stage reached and an integral part of the concrete moment. Because of this, to comprehend it is to recognise the direction taken (unconsciously) by events and tendencies towards the totality. It is to know the direction that determines concretely the correct course of action at any given moment-in terms of the interest of the total process, viz. the emancipation of the proletariat. However, the evolution of society constantly heightens the tension between the partial aspects and the whole. Just because the inherent meaning of reality shines forth with an ever more resplendent light, the meaning of the process is embedded ever more deeply in day-to-day events, and totality permeates the spatio-temporal character of phenomena. The path to consciousness throughout the course of history does not become smoother but on the contrary ever more arduous and exacting. For this reason the task of orthodox Marxism, its victory over Revisionism and utopianism can never mean the defeat, once and for all, of false tendencies. It is an ever-renewed struggle against the insidious effects of bourgeois ideology on the thought of the proletariat. Marxist orthodoxy is no guardian of traditions, it is the eternally vigilant prophet proclaiming the relation between the tasks of the immediate present and the totality of the historical process. Hence the words of the Communist Manifesto on the tasks of orthodoxy and of its representatives, the Communists, have lost neither their relevance nor their value: "The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independent of nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole."

### 2NC—AT: Policy/Fiat FW

#### The ballot should endorse the superior political methodology. This is best:

#### Cedes politics—liberalism naturalizes wage relations and oppressive structures, making our impacts inevitable—at worst, if the K turns the case then vote neg on presumption

#### Epistemology turns education—if we’re right that capital determines political conscious then their framework is pedagogically meaningless—it ensures serial policy failure.

### Impact OV [Long]

#### Capitalism triggers multiple scenarios for extinction alongside unspeakable systemic destruction—that’s Parr

#### Magnitude—global warming, ecological devastation, and transnational violence are extinction scenarios—minor reforms can’t turn back the inertia towards devastation

#### Probability—Economic crises, resource conflicts, social destitution, food price spikes, energy shortages, income inequality all commit unspeakable violence against billions every day—these are systemic impacts inherent to capital

#### Value to life is an external impact—capital confines life to wage slavery and false hope which decimates the value of lived experience

#### Try or die

Foster ‘5 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, "Naked Imperialism," Monthly Review, Vol. 57 No. 4, 2005

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue.

### 2NC—Economics Bad

#### Neoclassical economics is built on ideological denial of its own theoretical shortcomings—this indicts 100% of their methodology—extend Fine and Milonakis

#### Mathematical-deductive reasoning as ‘economic science’ models exchange as governed by universal laws ruled by pure chance, as if social relations emerge out of nothing. Denies all other modes of reasoning as ‘unscientific’ or ‘non-economic’ to avoid the tough questions

#### Denies systemic crises—plays off recessions as unpredictable ‘black swans’ despite their historical regularity as an ideological play to maintain inequality

### AT: Perm

#### Marxism requires universalized classist theory—extend Tumino—any risk of a link overwhelms perm solvency by diluting its vision of society with ideological commitments to the status quo.

#### Either perm links or it’s severance—bad because it forgoes argumentative responsibility, doesn’t test our intellectual strategy, doesn’t justify voting aff

#### Perm’s co-opted—causes extinction—the alt alone is key to revolutionary agency

Parr ’13 Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital, 2013, p. 2-5

The fable provides an intriguing persp ective on freedom and autonomy. The golem has no freedom: it is the rabbi who brings it to life and sentences it to death. Yet by returning the creature to earth, the rabbi holds the golem accountable for the destruction it wrought despite not being free. This is the basic premis e of this book. We are not free, yet we are autonomous. We are constrained by the historical circumstances into which we are born, along with the institutions and structures that contain us. Nonetheless, each and every one of us also participates in and thereby confirms the legitimacy of those selfsame institutions and structures that dominate us, along with the violence they sustain.3 In this way, we are both the rabbi creator and the creature creation. Insofar as we are socially constituted, we are constrained by the historical and institutional forces that construct us. As political agents, we realize our autonomy as we interrupt and contest the historical and institutional conditions that regulate and organize the frames of reference through which we think and act. This structure of rupture and continuity is the modern narrative par excellence. Fredric Jameson neatly summarizes the narrative condition of modernity as the dialectic between the modality of rupture that inaugurates a new period and the definition of that new period in turn by continuity.4 The ironical outcome, as I describe it in the pages that follow, is that despite the narrative category driving change in the modern world, everything continues to stay the same-perhaps because what this narrative produces is a virulent strain of amnesia. Every change or historical rupture contains within it the dialectical narrative structure of modernity such that the New and the period it launches into existence are mere ritual. What persists is the condition of violence embedded in neoliberal capitalism as it robs each and every one of us (other species and ecosystems included) of a future. The narrative of modernity and the optimistic feeling of newness it generates are merely a distraction. Distractions such as decarbonizing the free-market economy, buying carbon offsets, handing out contraceptives to poor women in developing countries, drinking tap water in place of bottled water, changing personal eating habits, installing green roofs on city hall, and expressing moral outrage at British Petroleum (BP) for the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, although well meaning, are merely symptomatic of the uselessness of free-market "solutions" to environmental change. Indeed, such widespread distraction leads to denial. With the proclamation of the twenty- first century to be the era of climate change, the Trojan horse of neoliberal restructuring entered the political arena of climate change talks and policy, and a more virulent strain of capital accumulation began . For this reason, delegates from the African nations, with the support of the Group of 77 (developing countries), walked out of the 2009 United Nations (UN) climate talks in Copenhagen, accusing rich countries of dragging their heels on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and destroying the mechanism through which this reduction can be achieved-the Ky oto Protocol. In the absence of an internationally birfding agreement on emissions reductions, all individual actions taken to reduce emissions-a flat global carbon tax, recycling, hyb rid cars, carbon offsets, a few solar panels here and there, and so on-are mere theatrics. In this book, I argue that underpinning the massive environmental changes happening around the world, of which climate change is an important factor, is an unchanging socioeconomic condition (neoliberal capitalism), and the magnitude of this situation is that of a political crisis. So, at the risk of extending my literary license too far, it is fair to say that the human race is currently in the middle of an earth-shattering historical moment. Glaciers in the Himalayas, Andes, Rockies, and Alps are receding. The social impact of environmental change is now acute, with the International Organization for Migration predicting there will be approximately two hundred million environmental refugees by 2050, with estimates expecting as many as up to one billion.5 We are poised between needing to radically transform how we live and becoming extinct. Modern (postindustrial) society inaugurated what geologists refer to as the ''Anthropocene age;' when human activities began to drive environmental change, replacing the Holocene, which for the previous ten thousand years was the era when the earth regulated the environment. 6 Since then people have been pumping GHGs into the atmosphere at a faster rate than the earth can reabsorb them. If we remain on our current course of global GHG emissions, the earth's average climate will rise 3°C by the end of the twenty-first century (with a 2 to 4.5° probable range of uncertainty) . The warmer the world gets, the less effectively the earth's biological systems can absorb carbon. The more the earth's climate heats up, the more carbon dioxide (C02) plants and soils will release; this fe edback loop will further increase climate heating. When carbon feedback is factored into the climate equation, climate models predict that the rise in average climate temperature will be 6°C by 2100 (with a 4 to 8°C probable range of uncertainty) .7 For this reason, even if emissions were reduced from now on by approximately 3 percent annually, there is only a fifty-fifty chance that we can stay within the 2°C benchmark set by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007. However, given that in 2010 the world's annual growth rate of atmospheric carbon was the largest in a decade, bringing the world's C02 concentrations to 389.6 parts per million (ppm) and pushing concentrations to 39 percent higher than what they were in 1750 at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (approximately 278 ppm), and that there is no sign of growth slowing, then even the fifty-fifty window of opportunity not to exceed 2°C warming is quickly closing. If we continue at the current rate of GHG emissions growth, we will be on course for a devastating scenario.8 We need to change course now.9 Climate change poses several environmental problems, many of which now have a clear focus. The scientific problem: How can the high amounts of C02 in the atmosphere causing the earth's climate to change be lowered to 350 ppm? The economic problem: How can the economy be decarbonized while addressing global economic disparities? The social problem: How can human societies change their climate-altering behaviors and adapt to changes in climate?10 The cultural problem: How can commodity culture be reigned in? The problem policymakers face: What regulations can be introduced to inhibit environmental degradation, promote GHG reductions, and assist the people, species, and ecosystems most vulnerable to environmental change? The political problem is less clear, however, perhaps because of its philosophical implications. Political philosophy examines how these questions are dealt with and the assumptions upon which they are premised. It studies the myriad ways in which individuals, corporations, the world's leaders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and communities respond to climate change and the larger issue of environmental change characteristic of the Anthropocene age. More important, political philosophy considers how these responses reinforce social and economic structures of power. In light of this consideration, how do we make the dramatic and necessary changes needed to adapt equitably to environmental change without the economically powerful claiming ownership over the collective impetus and goals that this historical juncture presents? By drawing attention to the political problem of equality in the context of environmental change, I need to stress that I am not a market Luddite; rather, I am critical of the neoliberal paradigm of economic activity that advances deregulation, competition, individualism, and privatization, all the while rolling back on social services and producing widespread inequities and uneven patterns of development and social prosperity. I am also not intending to make negotiable the "non-negotiable planetary preconditions that humanity needs to respect in order to avoid the risk of deleterious or even catastrophic environmental change at continental to global scales:'11 Indeed, my argument is that by focusing too much on free-market solutions to the detriment of the world's most vulnerable (the poor, other species, ecosystems, and future generations), we make these preconditions negotiable: the free market is left to negotiate our future for us.

#### Our epistemology arguments mean there’s no net benefit to the perm—the flawed knowledge of the 1AC aren’t compatible with the alt’s revolutionary potential

# 1NR

## K

#### Their epistemology is incoherent—we have to make strong truth claims to change anything

Castree ’99 N. Castree, Professor of Geography, 1999 [Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, June 1999]

Capitalism (as we knew it) arguably suffers from serious epistemological, ontological and theoretical problems. The epistemological problems are threefold. First, while Gibson-Graham is right to stress the performativity of representation, she hades towards what Bhaskar (1989, 127) calls the ‘epistemic fallacy’, in which knowledge and the world are conflated. Secondly, this links to a distinct and paradoxical reticence to make truth claims about the world. This reticence arguably stems from the dual theoretical inspiration for Gibson-Graham’s ideas – Resnick and Wolff’s ‘overdeterminist Marxism’ and Derridean deconstruction – both of which, in very different ways, see knowledge as non-mimetic. This reticence is paradoxical, since Gibson-Graham does, of course, argue for an economic ‘reality’ in which capitalism and class look quite different to how we previously saw them. Thirdly, all this neglects that fact that, in certain circumstances, making strong claims to ‘truth’ is strategically and practically necessary and important. These epistemological issues feed into several ontological complaints about Gibson-Graham’s position. First, after Resnick andWolff (1987), she is right that capitalism does not exist in isolation but is ‘overdetermined’ by all other elements of social life.21 However, this fact does not preclude attempts to specify theoretically the ‘essential’ characteristics of capitalism and class even though, in practice, they do not exist in a ‘pure’ state (Albritton 1993). Second, in the absence of such specification, social analysis declines into a flabby pluralism or explanatory ‘everythingism’. Third, in this respect Gibson-Graham’s charter for a small c capitalism and a pluralized class category, while appealing, is much too general and inchoate to be serviceable as an explanatory political economic analysis. This leads, finally, to the main theoretical – and arguably most worrying – problem with The end of capitalism. In her concern to deconstruct Marxism, Capitalism and Class, we are left with no effort of reconstruction beyond the otherwise important point that all three miss out a great deal. What, if anything, can usefully be salvaged from Marx’s political economy – with its categories of use and exchange value, concrete and abstract labour, labour power and surplus value – remains a mystery. Though I quite appreciate that the intent of The end of capitalism is not to rebuild Marxism, I would suggest that leaving things at the level of deconstruction is nonetheless unsatisfactory. Notwithstanding the validity of parts of Gibson- Graham’s critique, Marx’s abstract account of capitalism does not necessarily feature in an overblown vision of an no-longer-credible totality. There are other alternatives.22

#### They’re right that capital emerges from a series of contingent oppressions—however, it has retroactively totalized itself throughout them

Zizek 2k Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in Ljubljana, 2000, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, p. 225-27

In much the same way, is not Derrida’s ‘metaphysics of presence silently dominated/hegemonized by Husserl’s subjectivity as the pure auto-affection/self-presence of the conscious subject, so that when Derrida talks about ‘metaphysics of presence’, he is always essentially referring to the Husserlian subject present-to-itself? The problem with sweeping philosophical oppositions (all the others against me and possi­bly my predecessors) therefore lies in the problematic totalization of all other options under one and the same global label – the multitude thus totalized is always secretly ‘hegemonized’ by one of its particular species~ in the same way, the Derridan notion of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ is secretly hegemonized by Husserl, so that Derrida in effect reads Plato and all the others through Husserl. And it is my contention that the same goes for the critical notion of ‘essentialism’. Let us take the case of cap­italism itself: against the proponents of the critique of global capitalism, of the ‘logic of Capital’, Laclau argues that capitalism is an inconsistent composite of heterogeneous features which were combined as the result of a contingent historical constellation, not a homogeneous Totality obeying a common underlying Logic. My answer to this is the reference to the Hegelian logic of the retroac­tive reversal of contingency into necessity: of course capitalism emerged from a contingent combination of historical conditions; of course it gave birth to a series of phenomena (political democracy concern for human rights, etc.) which can be ‘resignified’, rehegemonized, inscribed into a non-capitalist context. However, capitalism retroactively ‘posited its own presuppositions’, and reinscribed its contingent/external circumstances into an all-encompassing logic that can be generated from an elementary conceptual matrix (the ‘contradiction’ involved in the act of commodity exchange, etc.). In a proper dialectical analysis, the ‘necessity’ of a total­ity does not preclude its contingent origins and the heterogeneous nature of its constituents — these are, precisely its presuppositions which are then posited, retroactively totalized, by the emergence of dialectical total­ity. Furthermore, I am tempted to claim that Laclau’s critique would have been much more appropriate with regard to the very notion of ‘rad­ical democracy’, to which Laclau and Mouffe regularly refer in the singular does this notion not actually cover a series of heterogeneous phe­nomena for which it is problematic to claim that they belong to the same genus: from the feminist, ecological, etc. struggle in developed countries to the Third World resistance to the neoliberal New World Order?

#### Overproduction—all corrective measures only aggravate eventual collapses

Wolff ‘9 Richard D. Wolff, Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and currently a Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University in New York, “Peak Oil and Peak Capitalism,” The Oil Drum, 3/27/2009, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/5245

The concept of peak oil may apply more generally than its friends and foes realize. As we descend into US capitalism’s second major crash in 75 years (with another dozen or so “business cycle downturns” in the interval between crashes), some signs suggest we are at peak capitalism too. Private capitalism (when productive assets are owned by private individuals and groups and when markets rather than state planning dominate the distribution of resources and products) has repeatedly demonstrated a tendency to flare out into overproduction and/or asset inflation bubbles that burst with horrific social consequences. Endless reforms, restructurings, and regulations were all justified in the name not only of extricating us from a crisis but also finally preventing future crises (as Obama repeated this week). They all failed to do that. The tendency to crisis seems unstoppable, an inherent quality of capitalism. At best, flare outs were caught before they wreaked major havoc, although usually that only postponed and aggravated that havoc. One recent case in point: the stock market crash of early 2000 was limited in its damaging social consequences (recession, etc.) by an historically unprecedented reduction of interest rates and money supply expansion by Alan Greenspan’s Federal Reserve. The resulting real estate bubble temporarily offset the effects of the stock market’s bubble bursting, but when real estate crashed a few years later, what had been deferred hit catastrophically. Repeated failure to stop its inherent crisis tendency is beginning to tell on the system. The question increasingly insinuates itself even into discourses with a long history of denying its pertinence: has capitalism, qua system, outlived its usefulness? Repeated state interventions to rescue private capitalism from its self-destructive crises or from the political movements of its victims yielded longer or shorter periods of state capitalism (when productive assets are owned or significantly controlled or regulated by state officials and when state planning dominates markets as mechanisms of resource and product distribution). Yet state capitalisms have not solved the system’s crisis tendencies either. That is why they have repeatedly given way to oscillations back to private capitalism (e.g. the Reagan “revolution” in the US, the end of the USSR, etc.) Moreover, the history of FDR’s efforts to counteract the Great Depression teaches fundamental lessons about capitalism as a system that cannot forever be deferred. Since the New Deal reforms then all stopped short of transforming the structure of corporations, they left in place the corporate boards of directors and shareholders who had both the incentives and resources to evade, undermine and abolish those reforms. Evasion was their focus until the 1970s, and abolition since. Capitalism systematically organizes its key institutions of production – the corporations – such that their boards of directors, in properly performing their assigned tasks, produce crises, then undermine anti-crisis reforms, and thereby reproduce those crises.

#### Capitalism is crises prone—collapse is inevitable

Li ’13 Minqi Li, “The 21st Century: Is There An Alternative (to Socialism)?” Science & Society: Vol. 77, January 2013, No. 1, pp. 10-43, doi: 10.1521/siso.2013.77.1.10

Over the past one and a half century, the long-term tendency towards rising wage, taxation, and environmental costs seem to have accelerated. The rising wage and taxation costs have reflected the long-term challenges from the “anti-systemic movements” (social democracy, national liberation movements, and “communism”), which forced the system’s ruling elites to make major concessions in the mid-20th century. The rising environmental costs have resulted from the relentless capital accumulation, which has greatly accelerated the depletion of the natural resources and the degradation of the global environment (Wallerstein, 2003, 57-66). As a result, the capitalist world system has been under great pressure to accelerate the pace of global industrial relocation. This has led to the dramatic expansion of the geographic zone of semi-periphery over the past quarter of a century. Most importantly, China and India, by serving as the centers of the latest round of global industrial relocation, have joined the rank of the semi-periphery. China’s per capita GDP has by now risen to about one-seventh of the US level and India could reach a similar relative level in about a decade. Given the enormous size of the Chinese and Indian population, then by around 2020, the world semi-periphery (defined as the geographical areas with per capita GDP around one-fifth of the level in the most advanced capitalist state) would have expanded to include about 60 percent of the world population. Can the capitalist world system survive such a massive expansion of the semi-periphery? With the massive expansion of the semi-periphery, there will inevitably be a major redistribution of the world surplus value. As less of the world surplus value is concentrated in the core, it will become increasingly difficult for the core states to finance capital accumulation in the leading industries. The core states will also have growing difficulty to maintain a large pool of “cadres”, the system’s skilled and managerial labor force or the “middle class”. Already, virtually all core capitalist countries are now confronted with insurmountable fiscal crises. Fiscal crisis, in essence, is the sign that capitalism in the core zone can no longer simultaneously provide favorable conditions of capitalist accumulation while maintaining “social peace” (that is, to secure the political loyalty of the middle classes) at home. It is widely recognized that the US hegemonic power is in irreversible decline, both in the sense that the relative economic position of the United States has been falling in the capitalist world system and in the more important sense that the United States is less willing and less able to regulate the system for the system’s long-term, common interest. The current expansion of the semi-periphery has obviously accelerated the decline of the US hegemonic power. More ominously for the capitalist world system, the great expansion of the semi-periphery has also made it much less likely and even impossible for a new hegemonic power to emerge by dramatically increasing the number of states that is relevant in the system-wide politics. This is shown by the expansion of the most high-profiled global policy making body from the so-called “G7” group to the so-called “G20” group. The capitalist world system is an inter-state system. The arrangement of the inter-state system is necessary for maintaining a balance of power between the state and capital in terms that are favorable for capital accumulation. However, the system also has a fatal flaw. As the system does not have a “world government”, there is no effective mechanism to secure and promote the system’s long-term, common interest (such as global peace, global macroeconomic management, construction of global social compromise, and global environmental management) and unrestrained inter-state competition could lead to the system’s self-destruction. Historically, the capitalist world system has relied upon the periodic hegemonic powers (the Netherlands in the 17th century, the United Kingdom in the 19th century, and the United States in the 20th century) as a proxy for the world government to regulate the system’s long-term, common interest. With the massive expansion of the semi-periphery, this historical mechanism required for the normal functioning of the capitalist world system begins to break down (Li 2008, 113-138).

#### If your memory is foggy, let us refresh it—the commies won the space race. Market competition makes collaborative progress on science impossible—alt solves better

Palecek ‘9 Mike Palecek, “Capitalism Versus Science,” In Defence of Marxism, 8/12/2009, http://www.marxist.com/capitalism-versus-science.htm

The ultimate proof of capitalism’s hindrance of science and technology comes not from capitalism, but from the alternative. While the Soviet Union under Stalin was far from the ideal socialist society (something which we have explained extensively elsewhere), its history gives us valuable insight into the potential of a nationalized planned economy. In 1917 the Bolsheviks took control of a backwards, semi-feudal, third world country that had been ruined by the First World War. In a matter of decades, it was transformed into a leading super-power. The USSR would go on to be the first to put a satellite into orbit, the first to put a man in space, and the first to build a permanently manned outpost in space. Soviet scientists pushed the frontiers of knowledge, particularly in the areas of Mathematics, Astronomy, Nuclear Physics, Space Exploration and Chemistry. Many Soviet era scientists have been awarded Nobel prizes in various fields. These successes are particularly stunning, when one considers the state the country was in when capitalism was overthrown. How were such advancements possible? How did the Soviet Union go from having a population that was 90% illiterate, to having more scientists, doctors and engineers per capita than any other country on Earth in just a few decades? The superiority of the nationalized planned economy and the break from the madness of capitalism is the only explanation. The first step in this process was simply the recognition that science was a priority. Under capitalism, the ability of private companies to develop science and technology is limited by a narrow view of what is profitable. Companies do not plan to advance technology, they plan to build a marketable product and will only do what is necessary to bring that product to market. The Soviets immediately recognized the importance of the overall development of science and technology and linked it to the development of the country as a whole. This broad view allowed them to put substantial resources into all areas of study. Another vital component of their success was the massive expansion of education. By abolishing private schools and providing free education at all levels, individuals in the population were able to meet their potential. A citizen could continue their studies as long as they were capable. By contrast, even many advanced capitalist countries have been unable to eliminate illiteracy today, let alone open up university education to all who are able. Under capitalism, massive financial barriers are placed in front of students, which prevent large portions of the population from reaching their potential. When half of the world’s population is forced to live on less than two dollars a day, we can only conclude that massive reserves of human talent are being wasted. The soviet government immediately tore down all the barriers on science that strangle innovation within the capitalist system. Patents, trade secrets, and private industry were eliminated. This allowed for more collaborative research across fields and a free flow of information between institutions. Religious prejudices that had long held back rational study were pushed aside. One only has to look at the ban on stem-cell research under the Bush regime to see the negative effects religious bigotry can have on science.

#### History is retroactively determined, but futurally contingent—action is key

Sheehan ’12 Helena Sheehan, “Is History A Coherent Story?” Critical Legal Thinking, 2/20/2012, http://criticallegalthinking.com/2012/02/20/is-history-a-coherent-story/

What did impress me was marxism. What set marxism apart from all other modes of thought was that it is a comprehensive world view grounded in empirical knowledge and socio-historical process. History has a plot. It is a more or less coherent story. All economic policies, political institutions, legal codes, moral norms, sexual roles, aesthetic tastes, thought patterns and even what passes as common sense, are products of a particular pattern of socio-historical development rooted in the transformation of the mode of production. It is not a pre-determined pattern or a closed process. Although there is a determinate pattern of interconnections, the precise shape of socio-historical development is only discernable post factum, for history is an open process, in which there is real adventure, real risk and real surprise, a process in which there are no inevitable victories. History is intelligible, but not predictable.

### 2NC—AT: Transition Wars

#### Non-unique and alt solves—extend Tumino—capital’s exacerbation of the contradiction between mass exploitation and wealth centralization makes social collapse inevitable—only a question of whether we are guided to communism through class politics

#### Capitalism will continually appeal to fear of collapse to justify its existence - these rely on a logic that is epistemologically disabling and self-fulfilling

Zizek ’97 Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana and Codirector of the Center for Humanities at Birkbeck College, "Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism," New Left Review, No. 224, 1997, pp.25-27

Today, financial crisis is a permanent state of things the reference to which legitimizes the demands to cut social spending, health care, support of culture and scientific research, in short, the dismantling of the welfare state. Is, however, this permanent crisis really an objective feature of our socio-economic life? Is it not rather one of the effects of the shift of balance in the ‘class struggle’ towards Capital, resulting from the growing role of new technologies as well as from the direct internationalization of Capital and the co- dependent diminished role of the Nation-State which was further able to impose certain minimal requirements and limitations to exploitation? In other words, the crisis is an ‘objective fact’ if and only if one accepts in advance as an unquestionable premise the inherent logic of Capital—as more and more left-wing or liberal parties have done. We are thus witnessing the uncanny spectacle of social-democratic parties which came to power with the between-the-lines message to Capital ‘we will do the necessary job for you in an even more efficient and painless way than the conservatives’. The problem, of course, is that, in today’s global socio-political circumstances, it is practically impossible effectively to call into question the logic of Capital: even a modest social-democratic attempt to redistribute wealth beyond the limit acceptable to the Capital ‘effectively’ leads to economic crisis, inflation, a fall in revenues and so on. Nevertheless, one should always bear in mind how the connection between ‘cause’ (rising social expenditure) and ‘effect’ (economic crisis) is not a direct objective causal one: it is always-already embedded in a situation of social antagonism and struggle. The fact that, if one does not obey the limits set by Capital, a crisis ‘really follows’, in no way ‘proves’ that the necessity of these limits is an objective necessity of economic life. It should rather be conceived as a proof of the privileged position Capital holds in the economic and political struggle, as in the situation where a stronger partner threatens that if you do X, you will be punished by Y, and then, upon your doing X, Y effectively ensues.

#### Once the transition is underway, autonomous communities act together in resistance to capital – capitalism will be on the ropes, faced with resistance on an unprecedented scale

Kovel ‘2 Joel Kovel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, 2002, The Enemy of Nature, p. 236-38

If such events as O’Connor envisions were to come to pass, they would not yet be ecosocialism, but they would form a kind of self-generative and non-linear dialectic that can rapidly accelerate the motion toward eco­socialism. After all, it is the ‘tens of thousands of local and regional experiments and practices’ who would have had to join with communities of activation to make this possible, and whose power would be accordingly magnified by it. And being magnified, the Zapatistas, and the Gaviotistas, and the Indymedia centres that connect them, and the politicized collectives of farmers from around the world, and the teacher’s associations, and the ecologically radicalized fractions of the labour movement, and the little Bruderhof-like manufacturing collectives making ecologically sane products with the aid of local credit unions, and all the ten thousand locally origin­ating but universally striving community formations — all would come together in solidarity to make such an event, and, in its aftermath, to press for further transformation. There is no point in predicting a scenario according to which this will expand, beyond the condition that it occur in the context of capital’s in­capability of regulating the ecological crisis. At some time within this span, the communities arising from the process may be imagined to grow to a point of relative autonomy such that they can begin providing material support for activists, with bases of operation and — in the case of those considerable number of communities producing food, wool, hemp, solar technology and so on — the actual means of subsistence for people engaged in revolutionary struggle. It must also be presumed — a large but feasible order that these people will have developed the spiritual and psychological strength enabling them to go forward. For there should be no mistake: the struggle for ecosocialism is no technical or voluntaristic process, but a radical transforming of self as well as world to link up in ever-widening and deepening solidarity Here is where post-patriarchal values will come forward, radicalizing human being itself for the struggle. Now the movement of events is self-sustaining, rapid and dramatic. Communities of place and of praxis increasingly coalesce to form miniature societies, and these enter into relations with others both inside and outside the national boundary. Capital may be expected to respond with heightened efforts at repression. A heroic phase begins, with much sacrifice. The awe­some might of the capital system now encounters a set of factors it has never dealt with before: • The forces against it are both numerous and dispersed. • They operate with changed needs, and on the basis of a kind of production capable of sustaining itself with small inputs and labour-intensive technologies; and they have secure bases and ‘safe houses’ in the intentional communities of resistance, now extending across national boundaries. • Their many allies in the interstices of the mainstream society are capable of forming support groups and ‘underground railroads’. • As with all successful forms of revolutionary protest, the oppositional forces are capable of shutting down normal production through strikes, boycotts, and mass actions. • The forces of capital have lost confidence, and are further undermined by support for the revolution within the alternative parties and their various niches in the state. This extends to armies and police. When the first of these lays down their arms and joins the revolution, the turning point is reached. The behaviour of the revolutionaries is spiritually superior, and the examples they set are given credibility and persuasiveness by the brute facts of the crisis and the gathering realization that what is at stake here is not so much the redistribution of wealth as the sustenance of life itself. Thus it could be that in an increasingly hectic period, millions of people take to the streets, and join together in global solidarity — with each other, with the communities of resistance, and with their comrades in other nations — bringing normal social activity to a halt, petitioning the state and refusing to take ‘no’ for an answer, and driving capital into ever smaller pens. With defections mounting and the irreducible fact all around that the people demand a new beginning in order to save the planetary ecology, the state apparatus passes into new hands, the expropriators are expropriated, and the 500-year regime of capital falls.

### AT: Cap Good—War

#### Capital drives war—that’s the 1NC impact—finite domestic resources and international competition pushes countries to invade others to sustain growth—that risks nuclear extinction. Liberal peace is a farce concealing constant exploitation and occupation.

#### This best explains present social and international conflicts

Everest ’12 Larry Everest, “WAR AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM: “Money for Jobs Not for War”: American Chauvinism and Reformist Illusions,” Global Research, 5/24/2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=31024

The slogan also promotes the idea that the political powers-that-be—if pressured by enough people—could scale back their military, stop attacking other countries, and instead use the money for jobs, education, and other social welfare programs at home. But that’s not how the system actually operates! Wars, invasions, and occupations are not policies of one set of politicians or another, or arbitrary choices made by this or that president. At this stage in history, capitalism is a global system, with the U.S. the world’s most dominant capitalist-imperialist power, presiding over a worldwide empire of exploitation. This empire rests on the domination of the oppressed countries where the vast majority of humanity lives, and on control of labor, markets, and resources. This entails the violent suppression of the masses of people in the dominated areas—and also entails fighting off challenges from other imperialists as well as rising forces in those countries that stand in the way. This requires a monstrously huge military that is deployed worldwide, with bases in over 100 countries, and wars when necessary. The wars for domination in the Middle East, Central Asia, and elsewhere don’t “interfere” with the functioning of U.S. capital—they’re absolutely essential to it, and to the U.S.’s overall global dominance. This is why the U.S. rulers are compelled—and willing to—spend trillions on the military, including during periods of severe economic and fiscal stress, no matter who happens to sit in the White House or Congress. This system of global capitalism-imperialism headed by the U.S. is the main source of the horrors that torment so many across the globe—from the ethnic cleansing and slow genocide of the Palestinian people by the U.S. and Israel, to the mass incarceration and slow genocide of Black people in the U.S.; from the rape of the planet to the systematic degradation and violence against women—here and around the world; from the extreme deprivation and starvation faced by billions across the planet to the growing poverty and desperation faced by millions in the U.S. The rulers in these imperial metropoles distribute some of the spoils of empire to provide a higher standard of living than in the oppressed countries and buy social peace and loyalty at home (which “Money for Jobs, Not For War” encourages). People in the U.S. should reject that foul pact! The vast majority in the U.S. have a profound interest in making common cause with oppressed people worldwide, not in siding with “their” rulers. That means fostering a morality that declares: “American lives are not more important than other people’s lives!”—not pandering to American chauvinism, which strengthens the system responsible for so much misery. It means people shouldn’t appeal to those on the top to “spend more on jobs,” but to clearly and unequivocally demand a STOP to the horrors the U.S. is committing around the world.

#### Visions of limitless growth must be understood in their historical circumstances—baby boomer economists have never known anything else, and presume it will always be this way—only historical and structural analysis shows these utopian ideologies for what they are

Foster and McChesney ’12 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at University of Oregon, and Robert W. McChesney, Gutgsell Endowed Professor of Communication, University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign, “The Endless Crisis,” Monthly Review, May 2012, vol. 64, issue 1, pp. 1-28

In 1982, speaking three-and-a-half decades after his famous debate with Schumpeter, Sweezy told his listeners at the Harvard Economics Club that the stagnation question arising out of the Great Depression had been “dropped without any satisfactory answer…. Reality is now posing it again,” demonstrating that “the burial of stagnation was, to say the least, premature.” However, what had fundamentally changed things since (beyond the growth in government spending) was the increased reliance on the promotion of credit/debt as a long-term stimulus to counter stagnation: Let me digress for a moment to point out that the fact that the overall performance of the economy in recent years has not been much worse than it actually has been, or as bad as it was in the 1930s, is largely owing to three causes: (1) the much greater role of government spending and government deficits; (2) the enormous growth of consumer debt, including residential mortgage debt, especially during the 1970s; and (3) the ballooning of the financial sector of the economy which, apart from the growth of debt as such, includes an explosion of all kinds of speculation, old and new, which in turn generates more than a mere trickledown of purchasing power into the “real” economy, mostly in the form of increased demand for luxury goods. These are important forces counteracting stagnation as long as they last, but there is always the danger that if carried too far they will erupt in an old-fashioned panic of a kind we haven’t seen since 1929–33 period. 36 There could hardly have been a more far-sighted description of the contradictions of U.S. capitalism, pointing ahead to the Great Financial Crisis of 2007–09, and to the conditions of severe economic stagnation that arose in its wake. These warnings, however, went unheeded, and no resurrection of the stagnation debate occurred in the 1980s. Addressing the failure of younger generations of left economists to take up the question, Magdoff and Sweezy observed in Stagnation and the Financial Explosion in 1987: We both reached adulthood during the 1930s, and it was then that we received our initiation into the realities of capitalist economics and politics. For us economic stagnation in its most agonizing and pervasive form, including its far-reaching ramifications in every aspect of social life, was an overwhelming personal

experience. We know what it is and what it can mean; we do not need elaborate definitions or explanations. But we have gradually learned, not altogether to our surprise of course, that younger people who grew up in the 1940s or later not only do not share but also do not understand these perceptions. The economic environment of the war and postwar periods that played such an important part in shaping their experiences was very different. For them stagnation tends to be a rather vague term, equivalent perhaps to a longer-than-usual recession but with no implications of possible grave political and international repercussions. Under these circumstances, they find it hard to relate to what they are likely to regard as our obsession with the problem of stagnation. They are not quite sure what we are talking about or what all the fuss is over. There is a temptation to say: just wait and see, you’ll find out soon enough.37 Yet, rather than ending with such a pronouncement, Madgoff and Sweezy went on to explain in the remainder of their book why a stagnation tendency was so deeply embedded in mature monopoly-capitalist societies, prone to market saturation, and why financialization had emerged as a desperate and ultimately dangerous savior. In their chapter on “Production and Finance,” they introduced a systematic analysis of the relation of the productive base of the economy to the financial superstructure (or as they also called it the relation of the “real economy” to finance), accounting for the increasingly shaky financial structure on top of a “stagnant productive sector.”38 In his final article, “More (or Less) on Globalization,” written in 1997, fifty years after the Sweezy-Schumpeter debate, Sweezy depicted the overaccumulation problem of developed capitalism in terms of three conditions: (1) growing monopolization at the global level with the expansion of multinational corporations, (2) the slowing down (or deepening stagnation) of the Triad economies, and (3) the “financialization of accumulation process.” For Sweezy, these three trends were “intricately related” and anyone wanting to understand the future of the capitalist economy needed to focus on their interrelation, and their presence within a capitalist system that was more and more globalized.39